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ALMOST BUT NOT QUITE PERFECT: 
THE PAST, PRESENT, AND POTENTIAL 
FUTURE OF HORIZONTAL 
MERGER ENFORCEMENT 
Marleina Paz* 
Since the beginning of his administration, President Obama and his 
colleagues at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) have espoused a renewed vigor for 
horizontal merger enforcement. While this more aggressive stance is 
appropriate given that the U.S. economy is currently recovering from a 
recession, the disparity between the government agencies’ and the 
federal courts’ approaches to examining proposed horizontal mergers 
poses an obstacle to successful legal analysis in this area. This Article 
presents four solutions that would close the gap in horizontal merger 
enforcement between the courts and the agencies—as well as between 
the agencies themselves—and achieve the government’s antitrust goals 
of fostering competition and promoting consumer welfare. These 
solutions regarding the adoption of the new Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, consistency between the FTC and the DOJ, the serious 
consideration of efficiency and efficiency-related arguments, and the 
utilization of behavioral economics would improve the analysis of 
potential business combinations. This is especially important in rapidly 
developing industries that, because of their inherent characteristics, 
pose unique challenges to determining when a horizontal merger will 
harm the economy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The law protects competition, not competitors.”
1
 This seemed 
to be the theme driving the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and its 
lawsuit against AT&T and T-Mobile, two wireless 
telecommunications companies that announced a $39 billion merger 
on March 20, 2011.
2
 Because the DOJ believed that competition 
would be harmed by losing T-Mobile as an independent competitor 
in the market—which would result in higher prices, reduced quality 
of service, and fewer choices for consumers—it argued that the 
merger should be permanently enjoined.
3
 While the merger may have 
produced some benefits, the lawsuit demonstrated that the DOJ was 
less concerned with the potential benefits of the transaction and more 
focused on how consumers would be affected by the lack of 
competition in the wireless telecommunications market. 
In cases such as this, Section 7 of the Clayton Act—(“Section 
7”)—which requires a merger’s challenger to show that it will create 
a reasonable probability of a monopoly or a substantial lessening of 
competition—governs.
4
 Because of Section 7, the government can 
preemptively attack mergers that would be likely to harm 
competition before consumers actually feel any anticompetitive 
effects in the market.
5
 Thus, Section 7 provides the DOJ with a 
 
 1. Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped—A Story of the 
Politics of Convergence, in ANTITRUST STORIES 331, 335 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane 
eds., 2007) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)). 
 2. Complaint at 2–5, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 
2011) [hereinafter Complaint, United States v. AT&T]. In mid-December 2011, however, AT&T 
abandoned its plans to merge with T-Mobile because of the government’s concerns with the 
transaction. AT&T T-Mobile Deal Dropped after Fierce Government Backlash, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/19/att-tmobile-bid-
dropped_n_1158851.html. 
 3. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). Since Section 7 applies “in any line of commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce . . . , the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,” the statute and especially its Celler-Kefauver 
amendments make clear that this law covers transactions such as horizontal mergers, vertical 
mergers, conglomerate mergers, and market extensions. Id. However, this Article focuses 
exclusively on horizontal mergers and the ways in which the federal government and the courts 
have addressed this topic. 
 5. Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of Consummated Mergers 
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 48 (2004). 
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statutory basis to preemptively halt deals like the AT&T and T-
Mobile merger if a federal court agrees that the transaction is 
substantially anticompetitive in nature. 
The case involving AT&T and T-Mobile is but one of the many 
examples of the Obama Administration’s renewed vigor when it 
comes to merger enforcement. Historically, enforcement of the 
antitrust laws that regulate horizontal mergers has been inconsistent 
due to the differing opinions of political leaders and judges.
6
 The 
most recent example of this is the Obama Administration’s more 
aggressive stance on mergers as compared to the Bush 
Administration’s position on the subject.
7
 Unlike the Bush 
Administration, which adopted a laissez-faire approach, the Obama 
Administration has repeatedly made it clear that it will aggressively 
monitor these transactions and “take effective action to stop or 
restructure those mergers that are likely to harm consumer welfare, 
while quickly clearing those that do not.”
8
 Given the distressed state 
of the economy, the Obama Administration has argued that increased 
enforcement will foster competition among companies, thereby 
stimulating the economy and benefitting consumers.
9
 
Despite these good intentions, various commentators have 
questioned whether the Obama Administration is properly handling 
the issue of horizontal merger enforcement.
10
 While the argument 
that increased oversight in this economy is necessary to ensure 
competition and promote consumer welfare is valid, some critics 
have argued that the Obama Administration’s approach to merger 
enforcement is effectively preventing beneficial business transactions 
 
 6. William E. Kovacic, Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 129, 134–36 (2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/kovacic/2009horizontalmerger.pdf. 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American Antitrust 
Institute (Sept. 27, 2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/aai-%20Presidential 
%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf. 
 9. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Vigorous Antitrust Enforcement in this Challenging Era: Remarks as Prepared for the Center for 
American Progress, 5–16 (May 11, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/ 
public/speeches/245711.pdf). 
 10. See Michael Mandel, Obama Should Restrain the Regulators, CNN (Aug. 17, 2011, 5:22 
PM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/17/obama-should-restrain-the-regulators/ 
?iref=allsearch; Peter Schiff, Obama Looking Like Job Killer in Chief, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2011, 
6:32 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2011/09/02/obama-looking-like-job-
killer-in-chief/. 
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from taking place.
11
 Furthermore, they assert that the government’s 
decisions are actually hurting consumer welfare by destroying jobs.
12
 
For these reasons, it is important to determine whether this more 
restrictive approach is as beneficial as the Obama Administration 
suggests that it is. 
There is another pressing issue in horizontal merger 
enforcement: whether the agencies
13
 in charge of merger review and 
the courts are treating these transactions appropriately. While the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ have engaged in 
federal litigation to challenge questionable horizontal mergers,
14
 
many of these issues are addressed outside of court at the agency 
level.
15
 For this reason, the FTC and the DOJ have created 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to help businesses understand what the 
agencies can consider when investigating these transactions.
16
 
However, these guidelines, which the FTC and the DOJ updated in 
October 2010, are not binding legal authority.
17
 Therefore, while 
courts have adopted some suggestions from previous versions of the 
guidelines,
18
 it is unclear whether they will readily accept the 
proposals from the new 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
19
 This 
will likely put companies in a difficult position as they plan and 
propose mergers, especially if they anticipate resistance and potential 
litigation. 
This problem of uncertainty is compounded for companies in 
rapidly changing industries, such as telecommunications and 
technology.
20
 Regarding market definition—a factor that courts have 
 
 11. Mandel, supra note 10; Schiff, supra note 10. 
 12. Mandel, supra note 10; Schiff, supra note 10. 
 13. This Article refers to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the DOJ collectively as 
the “federal agencies” or the “agencies.” 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a, 18a(b)(1)(A) (2006) (requiring parties to a merger to 
obtain agency approval before consummating the transaction). 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
hmg-2010.pdf. 
 17. Leah Brannon & Kathleen Bradish, The Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Can the 
Courts Be Persuaded?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at 1. 
 18. See infra Part II.B.3.b. 
 19. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
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emphasized as a starting point for establishing a Section 7 claim
21
—
the new merger guidelines state that the FTC and the DOJ will 
usually, but not always, start by defining a relevant market
22
 when 
challenging a proposed merger.
23
 Given this inconsistency between 
the courts and the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines with respect to 
market definition, companies in technology-based industries may not 
know what to follow as they structure their transactions.
24
 
Additionally, efficiency and innovation issues
25
 that inhere in the 
telecommunications and technology industries, if given enough time 
for research and development, may easily outweigh identifiable 
market concerns.
26
 Unfortunately, courts do not always focus on 
efficiency and innovation arguments,
27
 which puts certain companies 
at a disadvantage when attempting to successfully complete a 
merger. 
Given the current state of merger enforcement, this Article 
argues that while the Obama Administration’s aggressive stance on 
horizontal merger enforcement is necessary to foster competition and 
prevent harm to consumers in today’s economic climate, the real 
obstacle that companies and consumers face is the disconnect 
between the courts’ and the agencies’ approaches to proposed 
mergers. If courts do not attempt to adopt some of the new 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, companies may not have the guidance 
they need to structure successful mergers that will benefit 
 
 21. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957) (describing 
the “[d]etermination of the relevant market” as “a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation” 
of Section 7); see also Brown Shoe, Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (indicating 
that Section 7 requires the determination of market definition). 
 22. Defining a relevant market requires the parties proposing or challenging a horizontal 
merger to specify the industry and geographic location that the merger will affect. 2010 
GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 7–15. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 25. See infra Part IV. 
 26. See Sunny Woan, Note, Antitrust in Wonderland: Regulating Markets of Innovation, 27 
TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 53, 56 (2008). The term “innovation” refers to “scientific 
breakthroughs, important commercial inventions, product modifications and new production 
techniques.” Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Antitrust, Innovation, and Intellectual Property: Address Before the Stanford Law School 
Program on Antitrust and Intellectual Property (Oct. 7, 1994), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/0116.pdf. Mergers in rapidly developing industries may give companies the ability to 
innovate and create new and more technologically advanced goods or services at a lower cost for 
consumers. See infra Part IV. 
 27. Woan, supra note 26, at 55. 
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competition and consumers. This is especially true in rapidly 
changing industries like telecommunications and technology, which 
may have stronger innovation and efficiency arguments supporting 
their merger plans.
28
 In addition, if the FTC and the DOJ do not 
approach mergers in the same manner and give enough weight to 
factors such as innovation, efficiencies, and other economic concerns 
like job creation, courts will have less to consider when applying 
precedent to investigations that reach litigation. Finally, because 
firms and consumers are not always rational actors
29
 when it comes 
to the technology-based products that they use, the courts and the 
agencies should incorporate behavioral economics
30
 into their 
merger-enforcement analysis so they can better ascertain which 
mergers are truly harmful to the economy. If the courts and agencies 
fail to change the way they approach merger enforcement, they may 
unnecessarily block beneficial horizontal mergers that do not pose a 
great risk of creating a single firm with a dominant market share or a 
concentrated market conducive to collusive activity. 
In analyzing horizontal merger enforcement, it is important to 
understand how this area of law has evolved and how sensitive it can 
be to various economic considerations. Thus, Part II provides a 
backdrop for this Article by tracing the development and 
enforcement of antitrust law as it pertains to mergers. Part III then 
analyzes how horizontal merger enforcement is being handled 
generally and includes a discussion of how the Obama 
Administration’s aggressive stance on merger enforcement is 
appropriate given the harsh economic climate and why the agencies 
and the courts still pose an obstacle to successful merger analysis. 
Part IV focuses on what can be done to eliminate the disparity 
between the agencies’ and the courts’ approaches to horizontal 
mergers. Finally, Part V discusses the impact of horizontal merger 
enforcement on rapidly changing markets, with a focus on what the 
DOJ’s former case against AT&T and T-Mobile means for future 
mergers in industries such as telecommunications and technology. 
This part posits that, unlike transactions in traditional industries, 
these kinds of mergers require greater attention to factors such as 
 
 28. See infra Part IV.C. 
 29. See infra Part IV.D. 
 30. Id. 
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efficiency, innovation, and consumer benefits (including job 
creation) that undoubtedly improve consumer welfare in the long 
run; only then can the agencies and the courts make the proper 
determination about whether a merger will be harmful to competition 
and the market in general. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
An understanding of what horizontal mergers are and how 
corresponding policies have evolved is necessary to evaluate the 
current state of horizontal merger enforcement in the United States. 
The following section provides an overview of the mechanics of 
horizontal mergers, the statutes governing their implementation, the 
government’s role in overseeing these mergers, and the current 
administration’s actions regarding these proposed business deals. 
A.  The Basics 
According to neoclassical economic theory, people are rational 
actors seeking to maximize their profits in efficient and self-
correcting markets.
31
 Thus, if an individual or a firm makes a bad 
business decision while trying to increase profits, the market will 
correct this lapse in judgment and eventually cause the actor to leave 
the industry.
32
 One such way that an economic actor may decide to 
maximize its profits is by agreeing to a horizontal merger with a 
competitor.
33
 Government intervention in these kinds of deals is 
usually unnecessary because the market can adjust to offset the 
effects of faulty mergers,
34
 but there are certain circumstances where 
federal agencies and courts may have to step in and regulate 
companies engaged in horizontal mergers in order to protect 
competition and consumers. 
 
 31. Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1548 
n.136 (2011) (citing Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. 
REV. 925, 928, 933–34 (1979)). 
 32. Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 266 
(2010). 
 33. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65, 70 (2011). 
 34. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1548. 
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1.  How a Horizontal Merger Works 
A transaction between two firms qualifies as a horizontal merger 
“when one firm acquires another firm that manufacturers the same 
product or a close substitute, and both firms operate in the same 
geographic market.”
35
 In other words, the parties involved in a 
horizontal merger are competitors in a single industry and region that 
have decided to become one company.
36
 
Horizontal mergers between competing firms can have many 
important economic implications. First, a merger can result in fewer 
firms in the market, thus increasing market concentration
37
 and 
giving each firm involved in the transaction a greater market share.
38
 
Horizontal mergers may also lead to harmful monopolistic activity or 
collusion in the form of oligopolistic behavior
39
 on the part of the 
companies involved in the transaction, which can lead to price 
increases that may harm consumers.
40
 On the positive side, however, 
horizontal mergers may increase a firm’s efficiency and allow it to 
produce more goods at a cheaper price or invest more in research and 
development.
41
 Because mergers can cause these effects—and many 
more—Congress has enacted several pieces of antitrust legislation 
that allow the FTC and the DOJ to determine whether they should 
approve or challenge a proposed merger between competing firms. 
 
 35. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND 
ITS PRACTICE 542 (4th ed. 2011). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Market concentration refers to how many firms are in the market and how much of the 
market each firm controls. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 18. This factor can help the 
agencies determine whether a horizontal merger will have anticompetitive effects. Id. 
 38. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 544. Market share refers to how much of the market 
a firm controls. Market Share Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/market+share (last visited Oct. 6, 2012). 
 39. A firm engages in monopolistic behavior when it controls the market in terms of price, 
and it participates in oligopolistic behavior when it colludes with other firms to collectively 
control the market price. Economic Basics: Monopolies, Oligopolies and Perfect Competition, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/ 
economics6.asp#axzz1obtfCQ8O (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 40. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 544–45. 
 41. Id. at 545. 
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2.  Statutes Governing Horizontal Mergers 
The first piece of legislation
42
 that attempted to regulate 
horizontal mergers between competing companies was the Sherman 
Act.
43
 Passed in 1890, the Sherman Act gave Congress the 
opportunity to delineate violations of federal antitrust law.
44
 
Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that “[e]very 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is 
declared to be illegal.”
45
 Therefore, courts may find that horizontal 
mergers that seem to restrain trade by suppressing competition 
violate this section.
46
 
Complementing Section 1 of the Sherman Act is Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, which governs the area of horizontal mergers.
47
 
Congress passed Section 7 in 1914 to supplement the Sherman Act 
and allow the government to preemptively attack mergers that were 
likely to harm competition.
48
 Section 7 does not make mergers 
automatically illegal; instead, it looks to whether the merger has a 
reasonable probability of creating either a monopoly or a substantial 
lessening of competition.
49
 Because this section only focuses on 
probabilities, a court may enjoin a merger without first requiring 
proof that a transaction has already created anticompetitive effects in 
 
 42. This Article focuses on federal enforcement of antitrust law as it pertains to mergers; 
however, states and private parties can also sue to enjoin a merger that they believe is an illegal 
restraint on competition. Id. at 648–52. 
 43. Sher, supra note 5, at 44–45. 
 44. Id. at 45. 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 46. The issue of whether a merger promotes or suppresses competition falls within the scope 
of the “rule of reason.” See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). The U.S. Supreme 
Court has said the following on the subject: 
Although the Sherman Act, by its terms, prohibits every agreement “in restraint of 
trade,” this Court has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only 
unreasonable restraints. As a consequence, most antitrust claims are analyzed under a 
“rule of reason,” according to which the finder of fact must decide whether the 
questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into 
account a variety of factors . . . . 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 48. Sher, supra note 5, at 47–48. 
 49. Id. at 60–61 (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 
(1957)). 
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the market.
50
 Specifically, the current version of Section 7 states the 
following: 
No person shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or 
any part of the stock or other share capital and no 
person . . . shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets 
of one or more persons engaged in commerce or in any 
activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of such 
acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly.
51
 
In 1950, Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver amendments to 
allow the government to be more aggressive with its investigation of 
mergers and acquisitions.
52
 This is reflected in the quoted language 
above since the amendments make Section 7 applicable to both stock 
and asset acquisitions, whereas the original statute only applied to 
stock acquisitions.
53
 Furthermore, while Section 7 originally allowed 
the government to consider a merger’s anticompetitive effects only 
on the parties involved with a transaction, the Celler-Kefauver 
amendments permit the government to consider a merger’s 
anticompetitive effects on third parties in the same market as the two 
merging parties.
54
 
In addition to Section 7, Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act specifically allows the FTC to investigate 
mergers.
55
 This statute gives the FTC the power to regulate “unfair 
 
 50. Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile 
Transaction, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 48 (2011) (quoting FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 
568, 577 (1967)). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 52. Sher, supra note 5, at 50–51. 
 53. ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 967–68 (6th ed. 2010). This change in 
Section 7 was important because it closed a large loophole in the original statute. Id. To prevent 
the government from stopping a merger under the original Section 7, a company would acquire 
another company’s assets instead of its stock in completing the merger. Id. Therefore, the Celler-
Kefauver amendments allowed the government to regulate the multiple ways in which companies 
could accomplish a horizontal merger. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2011). It is also important to note that the FTC has specific authority to 
enforce the Clayton Act. Appendix 1—Laws Enforced by the FTC, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/append1.shtm (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). However, it 
technically does not have the power to enforce the Sherman Act. An FTC Guide to the Antitrust 
Laws, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/factsheets/antitrustlawsguide.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
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methods of competition in or affecting commerce,” thus enabling the 
agency to halt mergers that would be harmful to consumers.
56
 
A final statute that regulates horizontal mergers is the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act (“HSR Act”), which requires parties to obtain 
merger approval from the FTC and the DOJ.
57
 The HSR Act’s 
purpose is “to amend . . . Section 7 . . . by establishing premerger 
notification and waiting requirements for corporations planning to 
consummate very large mergers and acquisitions,” and its goal is “to 
strengthen the enforcement of Section 7” by allowing the 
government to investigate questionable mergers before they are 
completed.
58
 This statute illustrates the importance of the FTC and 
the DOJ in horizontal merger enforcement and allows the agencies to 
begin a process that may ultimately lead them to challenge a 
transaction in court. 
B.  Federal Enforcement: 
The Interaction of Federal Agencies 
and Courts in Analyzing Horizontal Mergers 
Given the statutory process that Congress has laid out for 
horizontal merger enforcement, the federal agencies and the courts 
each play a large role in this area. In other words, because of the 
premerger clearance procedures that the HSR Act requires, Section 7 
enforcement has become more of an administrative task than a 
judicial one.
59
 The FTC or the DOJ must first initiate merger 
investigations under the HSR Act before they can challenge those 
transactions in court.
60
 As a result, both the agencies and the courts 
are influential in determining which horizontal mergers will be 
consummated. 
 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 45. 
 57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a, 18a(b)(1)(A). 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1373, pt. 1 (1976). 
 59. See Raymond Z. Ling, Note, Unscrambling the Organic Eggs: The Growing Divergence 
Between the DOJ and the FTC in Merger Review After Whole Foods, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 935, 
939–50 (2010). 
 60. Id. 
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1.  Agency Enforcement: 
The FTC and the DOJ 
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ and the FTC are both charged 
with the task of investigating mergers and deciding whether they 
would cause substantial harm to competition and consumers.
61
 As a 
result of this dual enforcement system,
62
 the HSR Act requires 
parties to file a notice of their proposed merger with both agencies.
63
 
This starts a thirty-day waiting period, during which the FTC and the 
DOJ confer and decide between themselves which agency will 
review the merger.
64
 Then, one of two things can happen: the 
investigating agency can clear the merger, or it can issue a second 
request to further examine the transaction during another thirty-day 
waiting period.
65
 After the second waiting period ends, the 
investigating agency can allow the parties to complete the merger or 
it can challenge the merger in court.
66
 
2.  The Development and Use of 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
in the Agencies’ Work 
In investigating mergers and deciding which cases to litigate, the 
FTC and the DOJ have come up with Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
to focus their analysis of potentially anticompetitive mergers.
67
 The 
DOJ first issued these guidelines in 1968, and since then the agencies 
have created three major versions of the guidelines with slight 
 
 61. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 129 (2007). The FTC and the DOJ receive their power to 
enforce the antitrust laws from various sources. The Sherman Act and the Clayton Act allow the 
DOJ to pursue civil actions against companies proposing harmful mergers, while the Sherman 
Act also gives the DOJ the authority to pursue criminal cases for egregious violations—for 
example, explicit cases of price fixing and other clear restrains on trade—of the antitrust laws. 
See id. Aside from Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the FTC gets its antitrust enforcement authority 
from Section 5 of the FTC Act, which allows it to pursue both actions in federal court as well as 
administrative hearings against parties to a merger. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Mergers: Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm (last visited Sept. 29, 
2011). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 642; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 63. 
 67. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 1. 
  
Summer 2012] NOT QUITE PERFECT 1059 
 
modifications in between.
68
 While their content has changed 
throughout the years, the guidelines’ unifying goal has been “to 
prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from 
mergers.”
69
 To understand how the agencies have determined 
whether a merger harms competition, it is helpful to look at how the 
guidelines have evolved. 
a.  Horizontal merger guidelines of the past: 1968 to 2006 
In 1968, the DOJ issued the first set of merger guidelines.
70
 
These guidelines were based on the idea that “horizontal mergers that 
increase market concentration inherently are likely to lessen 
competition.”
71
 Therefore, the 1968 Guidelines specified the 
thresholds at which the DOJ would challenge mergers based on a 
certain market concentration.
72
 Prior to the release of these 
guidelines, courts used a four-firm (“CR4”) concentration measure, 
which accounted for the market shares of the four largest firms in the 
industry, to determine when a merger would be illegal.
73
 The 
downside to the CR4 approach was that the “legal standard for 
market concentration and increases in market concentration evolved 
in such a way that small acquisitions in relatively unconcentrated 
industries became illegal.”
74
 Thus, the 1968 Guidelines created 
standards that prevented the unnecessary injunction of certain 
mergers. 
The next major update to the DOJ’s Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines occurred in 1982.
75
 These guidelines specified a new 
focus for merger enforcement: “[M]ergers should not be permitted to 
create or enhance ‘market power’ or to facilitate its exercise.”
76
 
Additionally, the 1982 Guidelines introduced two new tools for 
 
 68. Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty 
Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 50 (2010). 
 69. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 543. 
 70. Id. at 702. 
 71. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 50–51. 
 72. Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in 
Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 782–83 (2006). 
 73. Id. at 782. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 52. 
 76. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, § I (1982), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf. 
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analyzing mergers: the hypothetical monopolist test (HMT) for 
defining the relevant product market and the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) for determining at what post-merger HHI level the 
agencies would move to block a merger.
77
 As compared to the 1968 
Merger Guidelines, the 1982 Merger Guidelines focused more on 
competitive effects and less on market concentration.
78
 Two years 
later, the DOJ made minor changes to the guidelines that addressed 
issues such as efficiencies and market concentration, thus resulting in 
the 1984 Merger Guidelines.
79
 
In 1992, the DOJ and the FTC jointly released a major revision 
of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
80
 This revision was especially 
notable because it was the first time the FTC joined the DOJ in 
formulating guidelines for merger analysis.
81
 The changes included 
the introduction of the concept of “unilateral effects,”
82
 a greater 
emphasis on market entry,
83
 and a shift in merger enforcement from 
traditional industries that provided consumers with homogenous 
products to industries that produced more differentiated products in 
connection with the “information age.”
84
 These changes indicated 
that the agencies were basing their decisions regarding which 
mergers to challenge less on the grounds of “structural presumptions 
based on market shares and concentration ratios” and more on issues 
 
 77. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 52. The HMT allows the agencies to determine if “groups of 
products in candidate markets are sufficiently broad to constitute relevant antitrust markets.” 2010 
GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4.1.1. The HHI measures market concentration by taking the sum 
of the squares of each firm’s market share; this helps the agencies determine whether a merger 
will have anticompetitive effects. Id. § 5.3. There are three types of markets: unconcentrated 
markets (HHI below 1500), moderately concentrated markets (HHI between 1500 and 2500), and 
highly concentrated markets (HHI above 2500). Id. Markets with higher concentrations are more 
likely to experience anticompetitive effects due to a merger. Id. 
 78. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 53. 
 79. Greene, supra note 72, at 786 & n.43. 
 80. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 
(1992, rev. 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf [hereinafter 
1992 GUIDELINES]. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 54. Unilateral effects are a type of anticompetitive effect 
created when a merger negatively impacts competition even if the other firms do not change their 
behavior. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 6. 
 83. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 54. “Market entry” refers to the ease with which a firm can 
enter the market. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9. The FTC and the DOJ currently look 
at the timeliness, likelihood, and sufficiency of entry into the market to determine whether a 
merger will be harmful to competition. Id.; see infra note 201. 
 84. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 49. Shapiro uses “information age” to distinguish the modern 
economy from the “industrial age” of the past. Id. 
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involving “qualitative competitive effects analysis.”
85
 In 1997, the 
agencies slightly revised the 1992 Guidelines with respect to their 
approach concerning merger efficiencies.
86
 This demonstrated the 
agencies’ belief that “mergers [could] promote competition by 
enabling efficiencies, and that such efficiencies [could] be great 
enough to reduce or reverse adverse competitive effects that [could] 
arise in their absence.”
87
 
Finally, in 2006, the FTC and the DOJ released a commentary 
on the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
88
 The purpose of this 
2006 commentary was to “provide greater transparency” and expand 
upon points made in the 1992 Merger Guidelines.
89
 The commentary 
focused on market definition and concentration, adverse competitive 
effects, market entry, and efficiencies to help those interested 
understand what the agencies examined during a merger 
investigation.
90
 It is also important to note that the FTC and the DOJ 
made clear that this commentary, while made prior to the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, is still useful today in interpreting the 
agencies’ approach to horizontal mergers.
91
 
b.  The current state of the agencies’ merger analysis: 
The 2010 horizontal merger guidelines 
On August 19, 2010, eighteen years after the last major overhaul 
of the guidelines, the FTC and the DOJ issued the latest version of 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
92
 The 2010 Guidelines build upon 
the previous guidelines and commentary by incorporating factors 
 
 85. William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of 
Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 224 (2003). 
“Qualitative competitive effects analysis” refers to the manner in which the agencies evaluate the 
market characteristics of a particular industry to determine whether a merger will have a negative 
impact on competition. Charles A. James, Overview of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
61 ANTITRUST L.J. 447, 452–53 (1993). Thus, instead of treating every merger in every market in 
a similar fashion, the FTC and the DOJ engage in a fact-specific inquiry for each transaction they 
investigate. See id. 
 86. 1992 GUIDELINES, supra note 80. 
 87. Shapiro, supra note 68, at 55. 
 88. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ 
215247.pdf. 
 89. Id. at v. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 1 n.1. 
 92. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16. 
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such as the HMT, entry barriers, and efficiencies.
93
 Additionally, the 
2010 Guidelines improve the agencies’ treatment of market 
definition and unilateral effects in order to bring the guidelines into 
agreement with current enforcement practices.
94
 For example, the 
new guidelines clarify that defining the relevant market does not 
have to be the starting point of merger analysis.
95
 If there is sufficient 
evidence that adverse competitive effects will result from a merger, 
sometimes this will be more informative than the market definition 
about the nature of such a transaction; consequently, market 
definition does not have to be defined first.
96
 This change thus ties 
into a prior addition to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines regarding 
evidence of anticompetitive effects.
97
 This section suggests that even 
without proof of market definition or market power—tools central to 
traditional market analysis—the agencies will be more aggressive in 
challenging mergers with potentially significant anticompetitive 
effects.
98
 Because of these changes, the 2010 Guidelines reflect the 
FTC and the DOJ’s goals of recognizing frequently used economic 
tools and increasing transparency with regard to the agencies’ merger 
analysis.
99
 
The timing of these revisions demonstrates that the merger 
guidelines do not necessarily change with each administration, but 
rather that those in office certainly have the power to influence them. 
For example, one of President Obama’s goals was to increase 
antitrust enforcement,
100
 and the FTC and the DOJ acted 
accordingly. Consistent with President Obama’s objective, the 
agencies revised the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010 to 
incorporate developments in antitrust and economics that took place 
 
 93. Christine A. Varney, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Evolution, Not 
Revolution, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 651–652 (2011). 
 94. Id. at 652. 
 95. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4. 
 96. Id. For example, evidence about potential price and output changes might be more useful 
than market concentration in determining whether a merger will result in harmful unilateral 
effects. Peter T. Barbur et al., Market Definition in Complex Internet Markets, 12 SEDONA CONF. 
J. 285, 287 (2011). 
 97. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of 
Justice Issue Revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/hmg.shtm. 
 98. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 2. 
 99. Varney, supra note 93, at 659. 
 100. Obama, supra note 8. 
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since the release of the 1992 Guidelines.
101
 This clearly illustrates 
that changes to the merger guidelines can reflect specific antitrust 
policies that certain government actors want both the courts and the 
firms planning mergers to consider. 
3.  The Courts’ Role in 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
Since the FTC and the DOJ have the authority to challenge 
mergers in court, federal courts have played a considerable role in 
horizontal merger enforcement. The U.S. Supreme Court has heard 
some of these cases and created important precedent; however, the 
Court has not addressed the merits of a Section 7 case in almost forty 
years.
102
 For this reason, most of the current analysis of horizontal 
mergers occurs in lower federal courts.
103
 It is important to look at 
both older Supreme Court cases and more recent lower federal court 
cases to understand the current state of horizontal merger 
enforcement. 
a.  Older cases 
The Supreme Court has heard several cases regarding mergers 
and acquisitions over the years, but the most notable cases come 
from the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s, the aggressive Warren Court 
almost always blocked the merger in question.
104
 One important case 
from the Warren Court era is Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
105
 a 
case in which the Court analyzed the merger of two shoe companies. 
The Court found that the merger violated Section 7 because the 
probable effects of the transaction would increase the new firm’s 
market share in various areas and result in a substantial lessening of 
competition.
106
 A year after Brown Shoe, the Court blocked the 
merger of two banks in United States v. Philadelphia National 
 
 101. Varney, supra note 93, at 651. 
 102. Daniel R. Shulman, A New U.S. Administration and U.S. Antitrust Enforcement, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 7 (2009). 
 103. Id. 
 104. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 987. 
 105. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
 106. Id. at 346. 
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Bank
107
 and established the prima facie test for determining merger 
liability: 
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue 
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a 
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that 
market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition 
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of 
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to 
have such anticompetitive effects.
108
 
Finally, in United States v. Von’s Grocery Co.,
109
 the Court 
blocked the merger of two major retail grocery companies, focusing 
on the importance of market definition in determining the harmful 
effects of a merger on competition.
110
 
However, the Supreme Court’s tendency to block mergers 
changed in the 1970s with United States v. General Dynamics 
Corporation.
111
 This case was a turning point because the Court 
allowed the merger of two coal-mining corporations, finding that 
even though the merger would increase the concentration of firms in 
the market, it nevertheless would not threaten competition because 
coal was a resource that could not be recreated.
112
 Thus, while this 
case had unique facts that influenced its outcome, General Dynamics 
indicated that merger enforcement policy would be less aggressive 
than it had been in the past. 
b.  More recent cases 
Since General Dynamics, subsequent merger enforcement 
decisions have unfolded in the lower federal courts. While there have 
been numerous merger cases since the 1970s, the following cases 
give a brief overview of how modern horizontal merger enforcement 
case law has developed. 
Starting in the late 1990s, several federal cases have shown how 
modern courts have addressed the issue of merger enforcement. For 
 
 107. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
 108. Id. at 363. 
 109. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
 110. Id. at 272–74, 277–78. 
 111. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 112. Id. at 494–502. 
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example, in FTC v. Staples, Inc.,
113
 the court granted a preliminary 
injunction blocking the merger of Staples and Office Depot, two 
major office-supply superstores, not only because each company 
would have had a greater market share, but also because the merger 
would have allowed the new firm to raise prices to an 
anticompetitive level.
114
 However, in United States v. Oracle 
Corp.,
115
 the court denied the request of the DOJ and ten state 
attorneys general for a preliminary injunction blocking the Oracle-
PeopleSoft merger because they failed to define a proper product and 
geographic market.
116
 Finally, in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, 
Inc.,
117
 the appellate court ruled that the district court should have 
granted a preliminary injunction blocking the merger of Whole 
Foods and Wild Oats, two organic-supermarket chains, because the 
product market that the FTC had identified—premium and organic 
supermarkets and not general supermarkets—was valid. These cases 
reflect various federal courts’ approaches to merger enforcement, 
which involve integrating certain portions of the FTC and the DOJ’s 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (e.g., the increased emphasis on 
competitive effects) while still adhering to older precedent that first 
requires the definition of the product and geographic markets. 
The cases since 2009 continue this trend. For example, in cases 
such as FTC v. ProMedica Health System, Inc.
118
 and FTC v. CCC 
Holdings Inc.,
119
 the courts granted preliminary injunctions blocking 
the mergers of hospitals in ProMedica and loss estimation and 
valuation software companies in CCC Holdings Inc. because the 
mergers would have resulted in greater market concentration of 
 
 113. 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 114. Id. at 1081–82. 
 115. 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 116. Id. at 1134, 1158. The DOJ and ten states lost this case on the ground of market 
definition because the witness testimony they offered to define the market was largely based on 
consumers’ personal preferences as to high-end automated business-data processing systems 
instead of whether the products were “‘reasonabl[y] interchangeab[le]’ based upon ‘price, use, 
and qualities.’” Id. at 1131. However, given the 2010 Guidelines’ assertion that market definition 
does not have to be the starting point of the court’s analysis—rather, evidence of a merger’s 
anticompetitive effects may be enough—it is possible that this case may have turned out 
differently today because of the merger’s probable effects. 
 117. 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 118. No. 3:11 CV 47, 2011 WL 1219281 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2011). 
 119. 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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firms, increased prices, and other anticompetitive effects.
120
 
Furthermore, in FTC v. Laboratory Corp. of America
121
 and Malaney 
v. UAL Corp.,
122
 the courts denied motions for preliminary 
injunctions because the plaintiffs failed to define the relevant 
geographic markets for the mergers in these industries—clinical 
laboratories and airlines—and failed to demonstrate that these 
transactions would not substantially lessen competition.
123
 Finally, in 
United States v. Verizon Communications, Inc.
124
 and United States 
v. InBEV N.V./S.A.,
125
 courts permitted the mergers of wireless 
telecommunications companies and of brewing companies, 
respectively, as long as the merging companies divested some of 
their assets to compensate for their transactions’ possible lessening 
of competition.
126
 Thus, a careful reading of these cases shows that 
federal courts have employed the use of the FTC and the DOJ’s 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines—especially when defining 
anticompetitive effects—but at the same time have, consistent with 
precedent, required parties challenging a merger to first successfully 
define a relevant product and geographic market. This has been true 
regardless of the industry in question: healthcare, airlines, 
telecommunications, and various consumer products. 
C.  The Obama Administration’s Approach 
to Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
Closely linked to how the FTC, the DOJ, and federal courts 
engage in horizontal merger enforcement is the overall 
characterization of how presidential administrations implement their 
respective antitrust policies. This section illustrates how the Obama 
Administration has been more aggressive than the Bush 
Administration in policing horizontal mergers, which reflects the 
current administration’s efforts to find a middle ground between lax 
and excessive enforcement of the antitrust statutes. President Obama 
 
 120. ProMedica Health Sys., 2011 WL 1219281, at *53; CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 
at 74. 
 121. No. SACV 10-1873 AG (MLGX), 2011 WL 3100372 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011). 
 122. No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010). 
 123. Id. at *7; Lab. Corp. of Am., 2011 WL 3100372 at *7–9, *23. 
 124. 607 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 125. No. 08-CV-1965 (JR), 2009 WL 2778025 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2009). 
 126. Id. at *1; Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1, at 1–2. 
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first revealed this approach as he was running for office. Specifically, 
President Obama said that because the Bush Administration had the 
“weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the 
last half century,” he wanted to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement” 
by increasing merger-review activity in an effort to protect 
consumers.
127
 Since contemporary enforcement strategies are (at 
least in part) a reaction to prior policies, it is helpful to place the 
Obama Administration’s antitrust activities in historical context. 
1.  The Pendulum Narrative of 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
According to several scholars, horizontal merger enforcement 
can be described by likening the government’s interventionist merger 
approach to a swinging pendulum.
128
 On one end of the pendulum’s 
swing, the government has been too aggressive in challenging and 
preventing mergers, while on the other end the government has been 
too lax.
129
 These scholars note that there have been four distinct 
periods of pendular swings, each with differing intensities of 
intervention.
130
 
The first three periods of the pendulum narrative capture efforts 
dating from the Warren Court era in the 1960s to the Clinton 
Administration in the 1990s.
131
 The first period, the 1960s to the 
1970s, is characterized as being “too aggressive” in terms of 
horizontal merger enforcement, especially since the Supreme Court 
blocked most mergers.
132
 The period of the 1980s is portrayed as 
being “too lenient,” with the Reagan Administration challenging 
relatively fewer mergers.
133
 Finally, the period of the 1990s—
especially during the Clinton Administration—is seen as being “just 
right” in regard to horizontal merger enforcement.
134
 For example, 
 
 127. Obama, supra note 8. 
 128. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 134; see also Jamie Henikoff Moffitt, Merging in the Shadow 
of the Law: The Case for Consistent Judicial Efficiency Analysis, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1697, 1724 
(2010) (describing the Obama Administration’s “stricter scrutiny of deals” as a pendulum 
“swing[ing] back towards more aggressive antitrust enforcement”). 
 129. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 134–35. 
 130. Id. at 135. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.; see supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 133. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 135. 
 134. Id. at 135–36. 
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the “zealous”
135
 agencies under the Clinton Administration 
challenged forty-six to fifty-one mergers a year between 1998 and 
2000, which equates to a little over a 2 percent challenge rate each 
year.
136
 Thus, these three periods describe the pendulum of merger 
enforcements as swinging from one extreme to the other, finally 
settling in the middle with the Clinton Administration’s horizontal 
merger policy. 
However, the pendulum narrative’s fourth period, which spans 
from 2000 to 2008, shows that the pendulum again swung to the 
lenient end of the spectrum with the Bush Administration’s antitrust 
policies.
137
 In this “cooling down” period of merger enforcement,
138
 
HSR premerger notification filings, second requests from the FTC 
and the DOJ, and actual challenges leading to consent orders or 
litigated cases declined.
139
 In contrast with the Clinton 
Administration, the Bush Administration opposed fewer mergers, 
bringing a low of four challenges in 2005 and a high of sixteen 
challenges in 2006.
140
 Even though companies filed fewer mergers 
during this time period because Congress increased the HSR 
minimum for the value of reportable mergers from $15 million to 
$50 million—which may account for the lower number of challenges 
overall—the average of the merger challenges brought between 2002 
and 2006 was still only 1 percent of the total amount of HSR 
filings.
141
 Furthermore, the trend of fewer governmental challenges 
to horizontal mergers was seen more clearly at the DOJ than at the 
FTC.
142
 Several of the more recent cases where the court ultimately 
allowed the merger to proceed, including Oracle
143
 and Whole 
Foods,
144
 were also filed during this era. 
 
 135. Ilene Knable Gotts & Phillip A. Proger, M&A Antitrust 2000 Annual Update: Clinton 
Administration’s Last Year Continued Zealous Enforcement Trend, M & A LAW., Feb. 2001, at 
17. 
 136. James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of U.S. Fed. Antitrust Enforcement: 
Learning from Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 3–4 (2007). 
 137. Kovacic, supra note 6, at 136. 
 138. Shulman, supra note 102, at 5. 
 139. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 1075; Shulman, supra note 102, at 5. 
 140. Langenfeld & Shulman, supra note 136, at 3. 
 141. Id. at 4. 
 142. PITOFSKY ET AL., supra note 53, at 1075. 
 143. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 144. FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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2.  The Obama Administration’s 
Place in the Pendulum Narrative 
Given that the pendulum swung toward the lenient end of the 
spectrum during the Bush Administration, the Obama 
Administration’s statements about bolstering antitrust enforcement 
make sense. In 2009, the FTC stated that its antitrust focus would be 
on industries that directly impact consumers, such as healthcare, 
energy, technology, chemicals, and consumer goods.
145
 Furthermore, 
the FTC and the DOJ released new Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 
2010 to give guidance to companies planning mergers.
146
 The FTC 
and the DOJ also continued to adhere to their policy of heightened 
merger enforcement by “applying increased scrutiny to mergers, both 
those subject to the . . . [HSR reporting requirements] . . . as well as 
non-reportable, consummated transactions.”
147
 Finally, in 2011, the 
Obama Administration remained consistent in its aggressive 
approach to antitrust enforcement by challenging more mergers than 
the Bush Administration, including the $39 billion proposed—and 
now defunct—merger of AT&T and T-Mobile mentioned at the 
beginning of this Article. 
The FTC and the DOJ merger statistics for the fiscal years 
during the Obama Administration support the assertion that the 
pendulum of horizontal merger enforcement is swinging toward the 
middle again. In fiscal year 2009, companies pursuing mergers made 
713 HSR premerger notification filings, while in fiscal year 2010 
that number increased to 1,200
148
 and consequently affected the 
number of proposed transactions that the FTC and the DOJ reviewed. 
Also in 2010, the agencies issued second requests in a little less than 
2 percent of the merger filings.
149
 Several proposed mergers 
 
 145. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Enforcement Priorities in the New 
Administration: Remarks at the Global Competition Review’s 2009 Competition Law Review 3–
4 (Nov. 17, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/ 
091117enforceprioritiesremarks.pdf). 
 146. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16. 
 147. Bernard Nigro Jr. et al., U.S. Antitrust Outlook, MONDAQ BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), available 
at 2011 WLNR 2072182. 
 148. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Overview of 2010 
Antitrust Enforcement: Remarks as Prepared for the 7th Annual Institute on Corp. Sec. and 
Related Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions (Oct. 7, 2010) (transcript available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264301.htm). 
 149. Id. 
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involving high profile companies were investigated, including 
transactions between United and Continental Airlines, Blue Cross 
and Physicians Health, Oracle and Sun Microsystems, and Microsoft 
and Yahoo.
150
 In fiscal year 2011, the number of HSR filings 
increased to 1,450, and the agencies issued second requests in 2 
percent of these filings.
151
 This included challenges to the mergers of 
AT&T and T-Mobile; H&R Block and TaxACT; George’s 
Incorporated and Tyson Foods; and Sara Lee, Grupo Bimbo, and 
BBU.
152
 The upward trend in these statistics demonstrates that as 
compared to the Bush Administration, the Obama Administration has 
challenged more mergers—many of which were high profile deals—
per fiscal year. This data thus reflects the agencies’ current 
aggressiveness when it comes to horizontal mergers. 
Aside from these statistics, perhaps the most notable sign that 
the Obama Administration is taking horizontal mergers seriously is 
the agencies’ update to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. In the 
overview to the guidelines, the agencies have made clear that 
“merger analysis does not consist of uniform application of a single 
methodology” but is rather a “fact-specific process through which 
the [a]gencies . . . apply a range of analytical tools . . . to evaluate 
competitive concerns.”
153
 Therefore, the agencies have made their 
approach to merger enforcement more transparent by laying out the 
following areas that they can examine in investigating a transaction: 
competitive effects, targeted customers and price discrimination 
(which includes the HMT test), product and geographic market 
definition, market participants, market shares, market concentration 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Sharis A. Pozen, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Developments at the Antitrust 
Division & the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines—One Year Later: Remarks as Prepared for 
the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, 2011 Antitrust Fall Forum (Nov. 17, 2011) (transcript 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/277488.pdf). 
 152. Id. Most recently, in November 2011, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia ruled in favor of the DOJ in its case against H&R Block and TaxACT. United States v. 
H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 92 (D.D.C. 2011). The merging parties could not rebut the 
presumption that their deal would substantially lessen competition, and consequently the court 
enjoined the merger. Id. 
 153. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 1. The agencies will examine facts particular to an 
individual industry, such as the power each firm has in the market, the effect of recent mergers on 
the market, the ease of entry or exit, changes in price, and customer reaction to the merger. Id. 
§ 2. Sources of this evidence include “the merging parties, customers, other industry participants, 
and industry observers.” Id. § 2.2. 
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(which includes the HHI index), unilateral effects, coordinated 
effects, powerful buyers, entry, efficiencies, failure and exiting 
assets, mergers of competing buyers, and partial acquisitions.
154
 
While the guidelines state that these areas of analysis are not 
exhaustive when it comes to what the agencies can present in 
litigation,
155
 the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines demonstrate that 
the agencies are willing to be flexible and creative in determining 
whether a merger will harm competition or be detrimental to 
consumers. 
The Obama Administration’s increased antitrust activity, 
especially regarding horizontal mergers, has set the pendulum 
swinging back towards a middle ground. While this reflects the 
administration’s efforts to find a balance between blocking harmful 
mergers and allowing beneficial ones, the question remains as to 
whether this approach is appropriate, especially given that the 
economy is still recovering from a recession. Even though this issue 
is complex, it can be analyzed by examining the FTC and the DOJ’s 
activity in combination with the manner in which federal courts have 
ruled on merger cases. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF HORIZONTAL MERGER 
ENFORCEMENT IN GENERAL 
Given the current economic climate and the Obama 
Administration’s horizontal merger enforcement policies, it appears 
that the government is handling the subject well. However, there are 
still flaws with the courts’ and agencies’ approaches to horizontal 
merger enforcement. More specifically, the agencies are actively 
using the updated 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, while the 
courts are more likely to make their decisions in accordance with 
precedent that follows older versions of the guidelines.
156
 Because of 
this disparity, the agencies and the courts must both find a way to 
reform their policies if they are to be effective in policing horizontal 
merger transactions. 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at n.2. 
 156. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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A.  The Appropriateness of 
the Obama Administration’s Approach 
to Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
Over the past three years, the Obama Administration has 
increased merger enforcement, as evidenced by the policies of the 
FTC and the DOJ. However, the following question remains: is this 
approach beneficial for the U.S. economy given its current state? 
This section will argue that given the economy’s struggles, the 
Obama Administration’s more aggressive approach to horizontal 
merger enforcement is appropriate because governmental oversight 
is needed to ensure that consumers are protected and that competition 
continues to stimulate economic activity. 
1.  Current State of the U.S. Economy 
Since 2007, the U.S. economy can be described as anything but 
strong.
157
 According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
the “Great Recession” started in December 2007 and lasted until 
June 2009.
158
 During this eighteen-month period, Americans lost 7.3 
million jobs,
159
 the popping of the housing bubble affected 
homeowners and depleted many of their assets, and consumer 
spending decreased.
160
 Some commentators aptly described this 
period as “an era of economic frustration, characterized by slower 
growth and contentious competition for scarce resources.”
161
 
Even though the National Bureau of Economic Research 
declared that the recession ended in 2009, its effects have lingered.
162
 
The economy has seen some hopeful signs: compared to 2009, the 
 
 157. Douglas A. McIntyre, 10 Signs the Double-Dip Recession Has Begun, MSNBC (Jul. 14, 
2011, 1:53 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43946055/ns/business-us_business/t/signs-
double-dip-recession-has-begun/#.TqysQlY0L7s. 
 158. The Associated Press, Great Recession Ended in June 2009, Panel Says, CBS NEWS 
(Sept. 21, 2010, 8:26 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/20/business/ 
main6884342.shtml. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Christina D. Romer, Council of Economic Advisers, Treatment and Prevention: Ending 
the Great Recession and Ensuring That It Doesn’t Happen Again: Remarks for the Council of 
Economic Advisors (May 3, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/rss_viewer/treatment_prevention_recession.pdf). 
 161. Robert J. Samuelson, The Great Recession’s Aftermath, THE DAILY BEAST (Jan. 3, 
2010, 7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/03/the-great-recession-s-
aftermath.html. 
 162. See id. 
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2011 unemployment rate has decreased slightly,
163
 and the nation’s 
gross domestic product has grown in 2011 more than predicted.
164
 
Despite these points, unfortunately, inflation has continued to rise, 
the housing market has not yet recovered,
165
 and the federal budget 
deficit has exceeded $1.1 trillion for the third year in a row.
166
 
Making matters worse are both the continuing lack of jobs for 
experienced workers and recent college graduates
167
 and the so-
called ever-increasing gap between the richest 1 percent of the 
population and the remaining 99 percent.
168
 For these reasons, some 
have reported that the “double-dip,” or a second recession, has 
started.
169
 Because of this perceived renewal of the economic crisis, 
many consumers and companies, including merging parties, may 
face even more obstacles as they try to continue or to enhance their 
businesses. 
2.  Criticisms of the Obama Administration’s 
Approach to Antitrust Enforcement 
The FTC and the DOJ’s investigations have become 
increasingly protracted and demanding, thus forcing merging parties 
 
 163. The Employment Situation—September 2011, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. 
DEP'T OF LABOR (Oct. 7, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_ 
10072011.pdf. 
 164. Chris Isidore, GDP Forecast: Growing Faster, But Not for Long, CNN MONEY (Oct. 24, 
2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/24/news/economy/gdp_forecast/index.htm. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) is seen by economists to be “the broadest measure of a country’s economic 
activity.” Id. 
 165. McIntyre, supra note 157. 
 166. Martin Crutsinger, Federal Budget Deficit Tops $1 Trillion for Third Straight Year, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 10, 2011 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/10/ 
federal-budget-deficit_n_923528.html. 
 167. Chris Isidore, The Great Recession’s Lost Generation, CNN MONEY (May 17, 2011, 
5:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/17/news/economy/recession_lost_generation/ 
index.htm; Francine Knowles, Lack of Jobs Leaves More Suburban, Middle Class Sliding into 
Poverty, CHICAGO-SUN TIMES (Jan. 23, 2012, 3:08 AM), http://www.suntimes.com/8305452-
417/lack-of-jobs-leaves-more-suburban-middle-class-sliding-into-poverty.html; . 
 168. Alan Bjerga, Protests Show Wall Street Will Be a Campaign Issue, Axlerod Says, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-16/occupy-
wall-street-shows-u-s-wants-a-fair-shake-axelrod-says.html. This is a reference to the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, which started in New York City and has become a worldwide protest 
against the concentration of wealth in the top 1 percent of the population and the inability of the 
government to provide relief to the middle and lower classes. See Jeffrey Sachs, Jeffrey Sachs 
Speaks to Occupy Wall Street, CNN WORLD (Oct. 30, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/10/30/jeffrey-sachs-speaks-to-occupy-wall-
street/?iref=allsearch. 
 169. McIntyre, supra note 157. 
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to provide more evidence that proves their transaction will not be 
harmful to competition.
170
 Given the state of the economy, this 
practice could greatly discourage companies from planning mergers 
if they believe that it is more difficult to successfully complete this 
kind of transaction. For example, instead of wasting time and money 
researching ways to complete a merger and defend against potential 
lawsuits by the FTC and the DOJ, companies may use their resources 
to work on other internal business projects. As a result, the FTC and 
the DOJ’s policies may stymie many beneficial mergers that could 
further innovation or foster industry growth.
171
 
Another argument against the Obama Administration’s 
aggressive horizontal merger enforcement strategy is that it may be 
hurting the economy even more by halting job creation. For example, 
Obama has been called a “job killer in chief” because his antitrust 
policies are seen as detrimental to American businesses’ survival 
chances in a competitive market.
172
 Many labor unions supported the 
proposed AT&T/T-Mobile merger because AT&T was at the time 
the only unionized company in the wireless telecommunications 
industry,
173
 but the Obama Administration’s “legal activism” in 
challenging the deal may have eliminated not only these unionized 
jobs
174
 but also potential jobs that could have resulted from other 
transactions.
175
 
 
 170. Nigro Jr. et al., supra note 147. 
 171. Mandel, supra note 10. 
 172. Schiff, supra note 10. 
 173. Mike Hall, AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Would Be Major Gain for Workers’ Rights, AFL-
CIO NOW BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://blog.aflcio.org/2011/06/24/attt-mobile-merger-would-be-
major-gain-for-workers-rights/; see also Nathan Newman, Pro-Labor Progressives Should 
Support the AT&T-T-Mobile Merger, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2011, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/prolabor-progressives-sho_b_883321.html 
(describing the benefits the merger will have on unionized jobs and noting that the 
Communication Workers of America is one of the unions that supports the transaction); Sasha 
Segan, Why Do So Many Groups Support the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger?, PCMAG (June 1, 2011, 
4:35 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386277,00.asp#fbid=0udcVgtWoFR (noting 
that many unions both in the United States and worldwide are advocating for the merger). 
 174. Maria Elena Durazo, Defending Merger Between AT&T and T-Mobile, DAILY NEWS 
L.A. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/ci_19108319. 
 175. Schiff, supra note 10. 
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3.  Why This Aggressive Approach 
Is the Right Strategy 
Despite these valid points, the very fact that the U.S. economy is 
struggling requires an aggressive antitrust approach from the 
government concerning horizontal mergers. Admittedly, successful 
mergers can help companies innovate, become more efficient, 
expand, and create jobs for American workers.
176
 During the current 
economic hardship, all these goals can help promote consumer 
welfare. Businesses may also have more reason to use the “failing 
firm” defense against FTC and DOJ challenges in order to argue that 
their mergers should be allowed to proceed; otherwise their 
companies would have to exit the market, causing more harm than 
good for competition.
177
 However, despite the beneficial reasons to 
allow mergers, aggressive horizontal merger oversight is still needed 
to ensure that competition is not hindered by harmful transactions.
178
 
If the agencies protect competition, companies will be more 
productive and more apt to stimulate the economy. 
History indicates that government oversight has helped 
floundering economies. Before the Antitrust Division increased its 
policing of antitrust activities in the 1930s after the start of the Great 
Depression, competition remained unregulated and produced harmful 
effects such as a lower level of firm output, higher commodity 
prices, and less consumer purchasing power.
179
 Toward the end of 
the Great Depression, the U.S. government revived its antitrust 
enforcement policies.
180
 From 1937 to 1943, the DOJ’s Antitrust 
Division began a “strengthened competition policy,” which included 
increasing the number of its antitrust case filings.
181
 This protection 
of competition played a part in the country’s financial recovery in the 
1940s.
182
 Drawing from this example, former Assistant Attorney 
General Christine Varney argued that “vigorous antitrust 
 
 176. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10; infra Part IV.C. 
 177. Phillip A. Proger et al., An Early Look into Merger Review in the Obama Administration, 
M & A LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 16, 18. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Varney, supra note 9, at 3. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 4. 
 182. Proger et al., supra note 177, at 18. 
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enforcement” is necessary and can turn the economy around.
183
 
Specifically, Varney said that there are two lessons to be learned 
from the Great Depression: “First, there is no adequate substitute for 
a competitive market, particularly during times of economic distress. 
Second, vigorous antitrust enforcement must play a significant role 
in the [g]overnment’s response to economic crises to ensure that 
markets remain competitive.”
184
 Because many commentators have 
likened the most recent recession to the Great Depression,
185
 this 
aggressive approach to horizontal merger enforcement seems very 
appropriate. 
During the Bush Administration, merger enforcement was lax, 
and the lack of competition regulation did not effectively help the 
economy grow. Consumer welfare decreased rather than increased, 
in part due to failing firms that harmed consumers as they 
floundered.
186
 Companies did not police themselves, and the current 
recession began.
187
 Based on these observations, the FTC and the 
DOJ’s revamped competition policy on horizontal mergers seems to 
be a good step forward. Because a laissez-faire approach did not 
work, perhaps a more aggressive one will be better. In other words, 
we need government oversight to prevent companies from making 
the same mistakes that resulted in the recession. Increased antitrust 
enforcement, at least in part, accomplishes that goal. Only time will 
tell whether this renewed horizontal merger enforcement policy—in 
combination with other government solutions to stimulate the 
economy—will ultimately bring the United States out of a potential 
double-dip recession, but as of now it seems to be the most 
appropriate antitrust remedy. 
B.  Existing Issues with 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
While an aggressive horizontal merger policy appears to be the 
best way to police potentially harmful mergers of competitors, there 
 
 183. Varney, supra note 9, at 4. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
aNivTjr852TI. 
 186. See Varney, supra note 9, at 4. 
 187. Id. at 4–5. 
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is still a problem with the current state of horizontal merger 
enforcement. Despite the commendable efforts of the Obama 
Administration in shaping antitrust policy to help the economy 
recover, there is a disparity in the ways that the agencies and the 
federal courts address the topic of mergers. This inconsistency in 
horizontal merger enforcement poses a challenge to companies 
considering such transactions because the parties do not know how to 
properly structure their horizontal mergers so as to avoid liability 
under Section 7. The government, therefore, must resolve the 
inconsistency between the agencies and the courts in order to achieve 
its goal of handling merger challenges with greater transparency.
188
 
1.  The Agencies’ and Courts’ 
Differing Approaches to 
Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
A discrepancy exists between the agencies and the federal courts 
when it comes to the subject of horizontal merger enforcement. On 
one hand, the agencies have been actively employing the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
189
 On the other, the courts seem to be 
strictly following precedent when making their rulings.
190
 This 
creates two issues: (1) the agencies’ work in preventing harmful 
mergers may be undercut by the courts’ refusal to accept the 
agencies’ approach to horizontal merger analysis; and (2) companies 
planning mergers may be at a disadvantage because they may not 
know what to expect if their transaction is ultimately challenged. 
In challenging questionable mergers, the FTC and the DOJ have 
consistently employed the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Recent 
filings by the agencies prove this point. For example, the FTC’s 
 
 188. Varney, supra note 9, at 5. 
 189. See, e.g., Complaint at 14–16, United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 2011 WL 5438955 
(D.D.C. May 23, 2011) (No. 1:11-cv-00984) [hereinafter Complaint, United States v. H&R 
Block]; Complaint at 3–11, Lab. Corp. of Am., No. 9345 (F.T.C. Dec. 1, 2010) [hereinafter 
Complaint, Lab. Corp. of Am.]; Complaint at 10–17, Phoebe Putney Health Sys., No. 9348 
(F.T.C. Apr. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, Phoebe Putney Health]; Complaint at 4–10, 
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc., No. 9346 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint, ProMedica 
Health Sys.]; Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 17. 
 190. See, e.g., City of New York v. Grp. Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2011); 
Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2010); 
FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015 
(D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011); Golden Gate Pharmacy Servs., 
Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-09-3854 MMC, 2010 WL 1541257 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2010). 
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filings to stop the mergers of clinical laboratories
191
 and hospitals
192
 
make it clear that the agency implements factors from the new 
guidelines and not from an older version. Additionally, the DOJ’s 
recent filings against companies such as H&R Block,
193
 AT&T, and 
T-Mobile
194
 show that the DOJ actively uses factors from the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines to support its arguments. 
Despite this, the courts seem to be utilizing precedent when 
making their rulings but do not seem to give much consideration to 
the new Horizontal Merger Guidelines. While the guidelines state 
that defining a relevant market is not necessarily the starting point of 
the agencies’ analyses,
195
 federal courts have required parties 
challenging mergers to first define a relevant product and geographic 
market as part of their claim.
196
 Without this market definition, 
courts have dismissed lawsuits against merging parties for failing to 
state a legally cognizable claim.
197
 This suggests that the courts are 
unwilling to fully accept the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ 
approach to determining what constitutes a harmful merger. 
The disconnect between the agencies and the courts creates an 
issue for both the agencies and the companies considering horizontal 
mergers. For example, the FTC and the DOJ may challenge mergers 
that are truly anticompetitive, but if they fail to state their case in a 
way that comports with precedent, then federal courts will apparently 
dismiss the matter without reaching the merits. As for parties 
actually planning mergers, the agencies’ and courts’ varying analyses 
are problematic because they provide little guidance to companies 
deciding whether to participate in such deals. Specifically, it is 
unclear whether companies should heed the new guidelines or follow 
past court decisions that take a slightly different approach to merger 
 
 191. See, e.g., Complaint, Lab. Corp. of Am., supra note 189, at 3–11. 
 192. See, e.g., Complaint, Phoebe Putney Health, supra note 189, at 10–17; Complaint, 
ProMedica Health Sys., supra note 189, at 4–10. 
 193. Complaint, United States v. H&R Block, supra note 189, at 14–16. 
 194. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 17. 
 195. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4. 
 196. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957). 
 197. See, e.g., City of New York v. Grp. Health Inc., 649 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir. 2011); 
Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 
2010); FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 
3810015, at *21 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010), aff’d, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011); Golden Gate 
Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., No. C-09-3854 MMC, 2010 WL 1541257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 16, 2010). 
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analysis. Responding to an agency challenge in court is a real 
possibility, especially for large companies planning merger 
transactions.
198
 It is important for these parties to know what they 
might face so they can plan accordingly and assess whether pursuing 
a merger is in their best interest. Therefore, something must be done 
to reconcile the agencies’ emphasis on the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines and the federal courts’ insistence on using precedent 
when analyzing horizontal merger cases. 
2.  A Possible Solution to 
This Enforcement Problem 
Even though it is possible for future administrations to change 
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which would require further 
adjustment to the way agencies and courts approach such 
transactions, a consistent approach is needed now given the obvious 
disparity between the agencies’ and the courts’ current modes of 
analysis. Approaches to horizontal merger analysis will constantly 
change due to developments in economics and the economy, but the 
goal of determining whether there is a reasonable probability of a 
substantial lessening of competition remains the same.
199
 Therefore, 
the agencies and the courts must consider and adopt the best 
analytical solutions possible that benefit both consumers as well as 
companies planning mergers. Ultimately, the agencies and the courts 
must agree on a single, flexible approach to merger enforcement if 
they are to achieve their goals of fostering competition, protecting 
consumers, and achieving transparency for companies planning 
mergers. 
IV.  PROPOSALS THE AGENCIES SHOULD 
CONSIDER TO REVAMP THEIR APPROACH 
TO ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
In order to make the process of horizontal merger enforcement 
more transparent for companies planning mergers, several solutions 
should be implemented. This Article proposes four different ways to 
 
 198. See Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7a of The Clayton Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 4, 
349 (Jan. 25, 2011). The most recent HSR filing thresholds are in the millions, indicating that 
mergers between large competitors are more likely than mergers between smaller competitors to 
be investigated and challenged. See id. 
 199. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
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improve the current state of horizontal merger enforcement: (1) the 
federal courts should be more amenable to using the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines; (2) the FTC and the DOJ must approach 
horizontal merger challenges in the same manner; (3) the FTC and 
the DOJ should be more open to considering merging companies’ 
efficiency arguments; and (4) the agencies should incorporate 
behavioral economics into their horizontal merger analyses to more 
accurately understand why companies enter into mergers and how 
their behavior may impact competition and consumers. As long as 
the agencies and the courts come to an agreement regarding 
horizontal merger enforcement, companies will have a better 
understanding of what transactions will be acceptable. This, of 
course, will help the government protect competition and promote 
consumer welfare because companies will more likely pursue only 
beneficial mergers. 
A.  Federal Courts Should Be More Open 
to Using the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
as They Decide Section 7 Cases 
Even though the Horizontal Merger Guidelines are not law, 
courts should be more open to using the 2010 version as they decide 
Section 7 cases. Since the Horizontal Merger Guidelines accurately 
summarize the economic analytical tools that the agencies use in 
determining whether a merger would be harmful to competition and 
consumers,
200
 courts would be wise to adopt the guidelines to bring 
their own decisions in line with modern antitrust analysis. This 
would then allow the courts to create new precedent that both the 
agencies and companies could rely on in ensuring the success of 
beneficial mergers. 
The main hurdle that courts face in incorporating the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines is the guidelines’ approach to market 
definition. Case law has established market definition as a necessary 
element of a Section 7 claim,
201
 but the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines do not require the FTC and the DOJ to always initially to 
 
 200. Varney, supra note 93, at 651. 
 201. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 3; see, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 
U.S. 294, 324 (1962); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 593. 
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define a relevant market.
202
 The FTC has made clear that “market 
definition is an important part of the analysis, but not necessarily the 
starting point and certainly not the end.”
203
 Rather, evidence of a 
merger’s anticompetitive effects on a market may be enough to allow 
the agencies to gain an injunction.
204
 This puts the current Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines at odds with the manner in which courts have 
decided merger cases in the past. 
This tension is new, as federal courts have used older versions of 
the guidelines in a “precedent-like manner” in other points of 
horizontal merger analysis.
205
 For example, in United States v. Baker 
Hughes Inc.,
206
 the court rejected the DOJ’s argument that the 
defendant had the burden of proving that market entry for hydraulic 
underground drilling rigs would be “quick and effective” after a 
merger.
207
 After this decision, however, the FTC and the DOJ 
adopted the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines that described entry 
as “a defense to the extent it is shown to be ‘timely, likely, and 
sufficient.’”
208
 Subsequently in FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc.,
209
 the 
court used the “timely, likely, and sufficient” criteria
210
 of the 1992 
 
 202. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4. 
 203. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Making the Grade? A Year at the FTC: 
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at Fourth Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, 
Georgetown Law Center, 4 (Sept. 21, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ 
leibowitz/100921makingthegradespeech.pdf). 
 204. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 4, at 7. 
 205. Greene, supra note 72, at 775. 
 206. 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 207. Id. at 987. 
 208. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 2 (quoting 1992 GUIDELINES, supra note 80, § 3). 
“Timely” in the 1992 Guidelines refers to “only those committed entry alternatives that can be 
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market impact.” 1992 GUIDELINES, 
supra note 80, § 3.2, at 27. However, the new 2010 Guidelines do not have this two-year 
requirement; instead, the FTC and the DOJ simply state that “[i]n order to deter the competitive 
effects of concern, entry must be rapid enough to make unprofitable overall the actions causing 
those [anticompetitive] effects and thus leading to entry.” 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9.1, 
at 29. This suggests that the Guidelines are more concerned with whether new firms can join the 
relevant market in time to effectively counteract the potential negative effects of a horizontal 
merger and less concerned with a specific time period that differentiates between very quick entry 
and longer-term entry. 
 209. 12 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 210. The FTC and the DOJ have carried these criteria over into the 2010 iteration of the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 9, at 28. The agencies have 
said the following on the analysis of entry barriers when determining a merger’s potential effect 
on competition: 
A merger is not likely to enhance market power if entry into the market is so easy that 
the merged firm and its remaining rivals in the market, either unilaterally or 
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Merger Guidelines in determining that the defendant distributors’ 
argument that entry into the wholesale prescription drug market 
would not be harmed by the merger and did not outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects of the transaction.
211
 This shows that, despite 
the precedent in Baker Hughes, the court in Cardinal Health 
followed the agencies’ merger guidelines to direct its analysis. 
Few decided cases refer to the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines,
212
 so the case law that companies may be relying on to 
defend their proposed mergers most likely predates the FTC and the 
DOJ’s most recent update. However, since courts have previously 
been open to the FTC and the DOJ’s analysis in the guidelines,
213
 
parties may look to this precedent and believe that the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines can be successfully cited as persuasive 
authority that supports their reasons for why their merger should be 
allowed to proceed. Unlike with previous versions of the guidelines, 
courts may be less willing to adopt the 2010 Guidelines because of 
the significant conflict between precedent and the agencies’ current 
view on market definition.
214
 This is most likely because the new 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines are only persuasive authority, and the 
precedent is grounded in the older language of Section 7.
215
 
Regardless, federal courts should consider adopting the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ approach to horizontal merger 
analysis. The goal of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to 
“promote transparency” regarding what the FTC and the DOJ 
consider when evaluating proposed mergers,
216
 and it is the agencies 
that provide the courts with the information that ultimately 
 
collectively, could not profitably raise price or otherwise reduce competition compared 
to the level that would prevail in the absence of the merger. Entry is that easy if entry 
would be timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter or 
counteract the competitive effects of concern. 
Id. 
 211. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d at 34, 55–58. 
 212. See, e.g., Malaney v. UAL Corp., No. 3:10-CV-02858-RS, 2010 WL 3790296 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 27, 2010). 
 213. See, e.g., Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 55–63. 
 214. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 3. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. for Econs., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Update from the Antitrust Division: Remarks as Prepared for the American Bar 
Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum (Nov. 18, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf). 
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determines whether a merger will be blocked by an injunction. 
Instead of being mired in precedent that utilizes older methods of 
horizontal merger analysis, the courts should use the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines even though they “ask more of the courts than 
previous versions have.”
217
 
It is true that the guidelines can be changed at any time by any 
administration, thus potentially causing much uncertainty and 
confusion for courts and merging companies. Theoretically, the FTC 
and the DOJ could change the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
multiple times during every presidential term, and the courts would 
have to review them in order to keep abreast of the agencies’ modes 
of merger analysis. However, frequent updates such as these are 
unlikely to occur. Over the past forty years, the agencies have only 
released four major versions of the guidelines—the original 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1968 and the significantly changed 
updates in 1982, 1992, and 2010—with only two slight modifications 
and a commentary for clarification in between.
218
 The fourteen-, ten-, 
and eighteen-year gaps between each major update have given both 
the courts and merging companies plenty of time to adjust to the new 
merger guidelines and act accordingly. Furthermore, all of the 
changes that the agencies have made have at heart the goals of 
protecting competition and preventing any one firm from unfairly 
dominating the market.
219
 These unifying themes have not been 
thwarted by the introduction of new economic tools; rather, the new 
methods of analysis utilized by the FTC and the DOJ are designed to 
bring the agencies closer to achieving their goals with regard to 
horizontal merger policies.
220
 By adopting the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines in their updated form either now or in the future, courts 
will be able to prevent confusion and give better guidance to 
businesses, especially since the new guidelines incorporate updated 
economic analysis that is likely to be more accurate about whether a 
merger is anticompetitive. 
 
 217. Brannon & Bradish, supra note 17, at 4. 
 218. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See Varney, supra note 93. 
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B.  Consistency Between the FTC and the DOJ 
Is Necessary for the Success of Mergers 
That Are Beneficial to Competition and Consumers 
More than judicial reform is needed, however—the FTC and the 
DOJ need to make procedural changes to the way they challenge 
horizontal mergers and must come to a consensus regarding how 
they initiate lawsuits against merging parties. Even though the 
agencies use the same Horizontal Merger Guidelines to guide their 
analysis, they have different processes by which they challenge 
horizontal mergers, which can affect the outcome of their case. 
Therefore, the success of a merger may depend largely on which 
agency decides to conduct the investigation.
221
 
Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act, the DOJ can bring civil actions against merging 
parties.
222
 For “clear, intentional” violations of the law, the DOJ can 
also file a criminal action against a party involved in an especially 
egregious merger.
223
 When dealing with a merger that is potentially 
harmful to competition, the DOJ seeks both a preliminary and 
permanent injunction against the companies.
224
 The issue of 
determining whether the horizontal merger should be blocked is 
resolved in a single proceeding, thus giving finality to the merging 
parties and allowing them to complete the merger absent a DOJ 
appeal.
225
 
On the other hand, Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the 
authority to pursue actions against merging parties that threaten 
competition both in federal court and in internal administrative 
proceedings.
226
 When pursuing an action in federal court, the FTC 
seeks only preliminary injunctions.
227
 If it loses in federal court, the 
FTC can seek administrative relief and file a Part III proceeding 
 
 221. See DEBORAH A. GARZA ET AL., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 130–31 (2007). 
 222. Id. at 129; HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 643. 
 223. HOVENKAMP, supra note 35, at 643. 
 224. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 130. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 129. 
 227. Id. at 130, 139. 
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internally.
228
 As a result, this fails to give the merging parties a sense 
of finality. Companies may move ahead with their proposed merger 
after winning in federal court only to face an expensive and lengthy 
FTC administrative challenge afterward.
229
 
This procedural difference between the FTC and the DOJ was 
made especially clear in the recent Whole Foods case. In this case, 
the court “explicitly articulated a standard that significantly 
reduce[d] the FTC’s burden of proof in its request for preliminary 
injunctions.”
230
 This lower burden of proof was due to the fact that 
the FTC seeks only preliminary injunctions, while the DOJ 
simultaneously seeks preliminary and permanent injunctions in court 
when challenging a merger.
231
 As a result, the DOJ has to establish 
its case by a preponderance of the evidence, while the FTC uses a 
lower standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction.
232
 Specifically, 
the FTC has to meet a “public interest standard” mandated by 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which allows a federal court to grant a 
preliminary injunction “[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the 
equities and considering the Commission’s likelihood of ultimate 
success, such action would be in the public interest.”
233
 
Review by either the FTC or the DOJ creates uncertainty and 
causes additional harm to companies because it is unclear whether 
merging parties will have to face more obstacles to their proposed 
merger after winning the initial lawsuit.
234
 To reduce this 
uncertainty, the FTC should follow the DOJ’s approach and file for 
both a preliminary and a permanent injunction at the outset of 
litigation.
235
 Knowing what they have to defend against will both 
allow parties to better prepare for challenges to their merger and 
instill a sense of finality after litigation in federal court is 
complete.
236
 Furthermore, adopting this approach will make certain 
 
 228. Id. at 130. Specifically, a Part III proceeding is the administrative means by which the 
FTC can seek a permanent injunction against a merger after failing to get a preliminary injunction 
in court. Id. 
 229. Id. at 139. 
 230. Ling, supra note 59, at 936. 
 231. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 138. 
 232. Id. at 139. 
 233. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 
 234. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 139. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
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that the DOJ and the FTC are on the same page when it comes to 
analyzing and challenging mergers. 
By requiring both agencies to simultaneously file preliminary 
and permanent injunctions in federal court, Congress will also ensure 
that the FTC and the DOJ are subject to the same standard when they 
seek to halt transactions.
237
 Since the FTC currently has a lower 
burden of proof than the DOJ, the FTC does not have to offer as 
much evidence to prove its case against an anticompetitive merger. 
Especially after Whole Foods, arguably the issue is “no longer how 
much the FTC must show in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, 
but rather how little the FTC can show in order to obtain such an 
injunction.”
238
 Thus, merging parties have more difficulty defending 
their transaction against the FTC than they do against the DOJ.
239
 If 
the agencies must file the same injunctions and are held to the same 
standard in federal court, then it will be clearer what companies have 
to prove and defend against to keep their proposed transaction viable. 
Applying the same standard to both the FTC and the DOJ will 
therefore allow the agencies to achieve their goal of transparency in 
explaining the agencies’ horizontal merger enforcement activity. 
Finally, the FTC should eliminate its internal administrative 
proceeding process.
240
 To achieve this, Congress must amend 
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act to prevent the agency from pursuing 
administrative action after attempting to obtain an injunction in 
federal court.
241
 By allowing the FTC to only file cases in court, 
Congress would save companies from uncertainty and the risk of 
protracted litigation against their proposed mergers. While the FTC 
may argue that administrative proceedings are needed as a backup in 
case courts allow anticompetitive mergers, the costs of both time and 
money for a second challenge can be draining on all parties 
involved.
242
 This statutory change provides another option that 
allows for finality and agency transparency, which will make 
horizontal merger enforcement a more unified and efficient system. 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. Ling, supra note 59, at 961. 
 239. See id. at 958. 
 240. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 140. 
 241. Ling, supra note 59, at 970. 
 242. GARZA ET AL., supra note 221, at 141. 
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C.  The FTC and the DOJ Need to 
Be More Open to Efficiency and 
Efficiency-Related Arguments 
In addition to establishing a unified approach toward merger 
enforcement, the FTC and the DOJ should also be more open to 
looking at factors such as efficiencies, innovation, and the potential 
impact on the job market when deciding to allow or challenge 
mergers.
243
 The agencies state that efficiency factors are important to 
their analyses of horizontal mergers, but in practice they often give 
little weight to these arguments.
244
 Admittedly, the FTC and the DOJ 
have had little time to clearly establish how they will use the 2010 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines with regard to efficiency and 
efficiency-related arguments in practice, but because the number of 
litigated horizontal merger cases is so few already, “it is critical to 
understand how the agencies internally analyze efficiencies”
245
 and 
to determine whether the current approach is best for competition 
and consumers. 
In the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the agencies state 
that mergers may be beneficial because they can “generate 
significant efficiencies and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability 
and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices, 
improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”
246
 These 
efficiencies can result from companies investing in research and 
development (R&D) to innovate their products and services, 
especially in technology-driven industries.
247
 However, for an 
efficiency argument to succeed, the merging parties must prove that 
 
 243. Specifically, the term “efficiencies” refers to the cost savings that result from the 
consolidation of competing companies. Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and 
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 49 (2007). Since these internal cost savings can free resources 
and allow companies to spend more time on areas such as product development and workforce 
expansion, innovation and job creation can be seen as important efficiency-related factors that 
also promote consumer welfare. Efficiencies must be “merger-specific,” meaning that they must 
be unattainable via another option that does not pose the same kind of anticompetitive concerns as 
the proposed merger. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 30. 
 244. Woan, supra note 26, at 55; see Moffitt, supra note 128, at 1698. 
 245. D. Daniel Sokol & James A. Fishkin, Antitrust Merger Efficiencies in the Shadow of the 
Law, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 45, 50 (2011). 
 246. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 29. 
 247. See Katz, supra note 243, at 12. 
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the effect can only be achieved through the merger.
248
 The FTC and 
the DOJ will apply a “sliding scale approach” to evaluate efficiencies 
and determine whether they are enough to outweigh the potential 
harm of the proposed transaction: 
In conducting this analysis, the Agencies will not simply 
compare the magnitude of the cognizable efficiencies with 
the magnitude of the likely harm to competition absent the 
efficiencies. The greater the potential adverse competitive 
effect of a merger, the greater must be the cognizable 
efficiencies, and the more they must be passed through to 
customers, for the Agencies to conclude that the merger will 
not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. 
When the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger 
is likely to be particularly substantial, extraordinarily great 
cognizable efficiencies would be necessary to prevent the 
merger from being anticompetitive.
249
 
This statement indicates that efficiencies can be important 
counterarguments to objections to the proposed merger, thus giving 
merging parties a fair chance to defend their transaction.
250
 
Unfortunately, the agencies have not given as much 
consideration to efficiency arguments—especially those touting 
innovation as an important outcome of a proposed merger—as they 
have to other factors.
251
 For example, a study focusing on the forty-
seven merger cases involving innovation arguments decided between 
1995 and 1999 under the 1992 version of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines demonstrates that innovation was not necessary to most 
of the courts’ decisions to either grant or deny an injunction.
252
 In 
fact, factors such as increased prices and entry barriers appear to 
 
 248. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 30. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
specifically state that “[t]he Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with 
the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed 
merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed merger-
specific efficiencies.” Id. Furthermore, the proposed efficiencies must be verifiable and 
quantifiable. Id. 
 249. 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10, at 31. 
 250. See Moffitt, supra note 128, at 1709; Woan, supra note 26, at 55. 
 251. Woan, supra note 26, at 66. 
 252. RICHARD J. GILBERT & WILLARD K. TOM, IS INNOVATION KING AT THE ANTITRUST 
AGENCIES?: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GUIDELINES FIVE YEARS LATER 2, 7–10 (2001), 
available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4mf5t2bm#. 
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have been more important in thirty-nine of these challenges.
253
 
Instead of looking at innovation, it seems the FTC and the DOJ have 
put more emphasis on “(1) price effects, (2) quality, [and] (3) . . . 
availability of the goods and services” that the proposed merger can 
provide.
254
 If the FTC and the DOJ focus on these factors instead of 
on other efficiency arguments, then there will be nothing to consider 
in the agencies’ sliding-scale analysis that would counteract the 
supposed anticompetitive nature of the proposed merger. 
Increased employment for American workers should also be 
seen as an efficiency-related outcome and, consequently, should be 
given more weight in the FTC and the DOJ’s initial determination of 
whether to challenge a proposed horizontal merger. Job creation is 
especially important since employment is a pressing concern in this 
economy. Given that the unemployment rate is still around 8 
percent,
255
 job creation is a legitimate efficiency argument that 
directly impacts consumer welfare: having more workers would 
allow companies to innovate more quickly and create products for 
public consumption more cost efficiently. This increased workforce 
and creation of improved products would then spur competition 
because other companies in the same industry would have to adapt in 
order to remain successful. If the FTC and the DOJ fail to 
appropriately consider these employment consequences, they may 
ignore an important benefit that could be great enough to outweigh 
the proposed merger’s anticompetitive effects. 
Efficiency arguments, especially those involving innovation and 
job creation, are important to consider in this economic climate. If 
companies have legitimate arguments showing that their merger will 
result in more choices and better products for consumers, as well as 
more jobs for the public, then these factors should be appropriately 
incorporated into the FTC and the DOJ’s sliding-scale analysis of 
efficiencies versus anticompetitive effects. If the agencies fail to do 
so, then mergers that may be beneficial to consumer welfare may be 
unnecessarily blocked, which would cause more harm than good to 
the economy overall. 
 
 253. Id. at 7–10. 
 254. Woan, supra note 26, at 66. 
 255. Motoko Rich, Job Gains Reflect Hope a Recovery Is Blooming, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 
2012, at B1. 
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D.  The Agencies Should Incorporate 
Behavioral Economics into Their 
Analyses of Horizontal Mergers 
Behavioral economics—an interdisciplinary economic theory 
that incorporates elements from fields such as neuroscience, 
psychology, and sociology in order to determine human behavior in 
the market
256
—is not a tool currently incorporated in the Horizontal 
Merger Guideline analysis, but it is something that the agencies 
should seriously consider when determining whether a merger is 
harmful enough to be blocked.
257
 While FTC Commissioner J. 
Thomas Rosch has stated that the FTC would consider “how to 
incorporate behavioral economics principles into [its] enforcement 
decisions,”
258
 this has yet to be seen in the government’s antitrust 
practices. If the government is to promote competition and protect 
consumers, it must utilize all available economic means of 
examining how firms act and how their choices may impact others in 
the marketplace. 
Behavioral economics is different from the traditional Chicago 
School view of economic theory that underlies the agencies’ 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
259
 The Chicago School assumes that 
firms in the market are perfectly “rational profit maximizers,” which 
enables economists and policy makers to predict how these firms will 
act in any given situation.
260
 This theory is the basis for the agencies’ 
assumption that firms are rational actors seeking to maximize their 
profits when planning mergers.
261
 However, behavioral economics 
runs counter to the Chicago School’s view of economic actors 
because it assumes that firms do not always act rationally or 
predictably.
262
 Instead, it assumes that actors behave according to 
their “bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-
 
 256. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1532. 
 257. See id. at 1531. 
 258. Rosch, supra note 145, at 23. 
 259. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1552. 
 260. Id. at 1548 (quoting Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 
U. PA. L. REV. 925, 928, 933–34 (1979)). 
 261. Id. at 1532; see also 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 1, at 2 (“In evaluating how a 
merger will likely change a firm's behavior, the Agencies focus primarily on how the merger 
affects conduct that would be most profitable for the firm.”). 
 262. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1532. 
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interest.”
263
 Specifically, behavioral economics suggests that 
economic actors (1) act rationally but are biased toward their goals 
and beliefs (bounded rationality); (2) sometimes behave in a manner 
that is harmful to their long-term interests because of the short-term 
benefits (bounded willpower); and (3) may be motivated by the 
desire to benefit others rather than to maximize wealth (bounded 
self-interest).
264
 
Given the weakened state of the economy, behavioral economics 
offers several benefits. Firms do not always act as perfectly rational 
actors, and behavioral economics can be used to account for that fact 
in horizontal merger analysis. People often make decisions and plan 
mergers in a way that runs contrary to the assumptions of traditional 
economics; for example, chief executive officers in particular have 
been “both overly confident in their abilities and more risk-seeking 
than a rational choice model would predict.”
265
 This explains why 
companies may act in an economically irrational manner when they 
overestimate the efficiencies of their planned mergers.
266
 For 
example, the AOL/Time-Warner and Sony/Columbia Pictures 
mergers did not result in the efficiencies that the merging parties 
believed would occur.
267
 These deals were allowed under a 
traditional antitrust analysis, but the use of behavioral economics 
may have helped the agencies better analyze the merging companies’ 
biases and evaluate whether the deals would actually result in 
efficiencies that would benefit consumers.
268
 Furthermore, the 
Chicago School posits that the rationality of firms allows markets to 
self-correct and operate efficiently, but the recent recession that the 
United States has experienced proves that firms can act irrationally 
and actually make the market and consumers worse off than 
before.
269
 Therefore, the Chicago School assumptions that drive 
traditional merger analysis are not always valid.
270
 The effect that 
economically irrational firms have on consumers needs to be taken 
 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1533–38. 
 265. Langevoort, supra note 33, at 71. 
 266. Reeves & Stucke, supra note 31, at 1561–62. 
 267. Id. 
 268. See id. 
 269. Id. at 1531, 1539–41. 
 270. Id. at 1532. 
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into consideration when determining how a merger will impact 
competition and consumer welfare.
271
 
Since behavioral economics has developed as a way to deal with 
irrational actors, this theory can supplement the agencies’ current 
approach to analyzing the behavior of merging parties.
272
 By looking 
at mergers in terms of bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and 
bounded self-interest, the FTC and the DOJ can more accurately 
grasp why companies plan mergers. This allows the agencies to 
account for any bias that merging parties may have, especially in 
regard to two factors that the FTC and the DOJ have included in their 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines: entry barriers and efficiencies.
273
 For 
example, bias can influence what companies believe a merger can 
accomplish in terms of efficiencies and whether firms enter into the 
market after a proposed merger.
274
 The agencies and the merging 
parties will undoubtedly include arguments regarding entry barriers 
and efficiencies in any filing or argument that they present in court. 
For instance, the agencies could use behavioral economics to argue, 
both in their pleadings and with expert witnesses at trial, that a 
merger that would pass traditional analysis—such as the AOL/Time-
Warner or Sony/Columbia Pictures mergers—would harm 
competition because the merging parties are biased in believing that 
their deal will generate cost savings for consumers when it would 
actually make it more difficult for other companies to enter the 
market and provide the same or similar service or good. Based on 
this information, courts can make more informed decisions when 
ruling on whether a merger should be enjoined. Even though 
behavioral economics is unlikely to inform a definitive rule that the 
courts can employ when deciding horizontal merger cases, it can still 
 
 271. See id. at 1532–33. 
 272. See id. at 1553–54. 
 273. Id. at 1557–63. 
 274. Id. The three kinds of bias that can have an effect on entry barriers are “optimistic bias,” 
“desirability bias” (also known as “wishful thinking”), and the bias that results when firms ignore 
the current state of competition and focus on themselves instead. Id. at 1557–58. Because firms 
may not fully understand how a merger may affect the market, behavioral economics would be 
helpful in explaining the actions of companies evaluating whether to enter the market after such a 
proposed transaction. See id. Regarding efficiencies, merging companies may demonstrate signs 
of “self-attribution bias” and overestimate the beneficial aspects of their proposed transaction 
based on their companies’ previous successes. Id. at 1562–63. Looking at this self-attribution bias 
can help the agencies and the courts determine whether a merging party’s efficiency argument is 
valid. Id. 
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be beneficial to the FTC and the DOJ in making their prelitigation 
determinations of whether a transaction will harm competition and 
consumers more comprehensive. 
Although the agencies should not completely displace the 
economics they currently use in analyzing horizontal mergers, they 
should integrate elements of behavioral economics so that their 
analyses accurately reflect what can happen in the market. This 
economic theory does upset the traditional Chicago School approach 
by complicating the view of the market and market participants, and 
it does not allow for an exacting test for whether a horizontal merger 
will be beneficial, but it also expands the agencies’ and courts’ views 
on what could hinder or help competition and consumers.
275
 Some 
scholars have said that “the insights from behavioral economics 
can . . . provid[e] agencies, courts, and legislatures with an additional 
lens through which to understand the facts before them,”
276
 which is 
what is needed to make horizontal merger analysis more accurate. 
Behavioral economics takes into account what the Chicago School 
does not, and these insights can make a difference in helping the 
government and companies understand what kinds of mergers are 
acceptable. 
V.  THE IMPORTANCE OF HORIZONTAL 
MERGER ENFORCEMENT REFORM 
IN RAPIDLY CHANGING INDUSTRIES 
The changes discussed in Part IV of this Article are especially 
crucial for the successful handling of mergers in rapidly changing 
industries such as telecommunications and technology. Since these 
industries are dynamic, the agencies and the courts must pay 
particular attention to how they approach Section 7 challenges in 
these sectors. Even though the agencies say they apply the merger 
guidelines in a fact-specific manner, they must also account for other 
factors, such as arguments for efficiencies and innovation, job 
creation, and failing firms.
277
 If they do not, mergers that benefit 
 
 275. See id. at 1577. 
 276. Id. at 1544. 
 277. For some larger companies, the agencies and the courts have an additional factor to 
consider: the effect that foreign activity has on domestic competition. Some technology 
companies such as Microsoft, Google, and Intel are multinational corporations with competitors 
across the globe. See generally World’s Best Multinational Workplaces, GREAT PLACE TO WORK, 
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consumers and help the economy in the long run may unnecessarily 
be blocked. 
A.  Rapidly Changing Industries 
Such As Telecommunications 
and Technology Are Unique 
Because of the particular characteristics of technology-based 
industries, mergers of competitors in these industries require special 
consideration. Technology-based industries are dynamic because 
they constantly benefit from technological advances, which makes it 
more difficult to predict the effects a merger will have on 
competition.
278
 As a result, the application of traditional horizontal 
merger analysis may not achieve antitrust policy’s goals of fostering 
competition and ensuring consumer welfare. 
According to one scholar, one of the three typical features of 
these industries that complicates horizontal merger analysis is the 
prevalence of R&D.
279
 Because of the R&D that goes into product 
development and production, these industries “undergo rapid rates of 
technological change, much more so than traditional markets,” which 
complicates the forecasting of industry growth.
280
 “The king-size[d] 
firms of today [may] become the technological guppies of 
 
http://www.greatplacetowork.com/best-companies/worlds-best-multinationals/list-of-the-25-best-
from-2011 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing data for the top twenty-five multinational 
workplaces in 2011). These companies’ overseas operations may serve as a check on their 
domestic market power because they must use some of their resources to be successful abroad. 
See, e.g., Douglas MacMillan, Google Undergoes Global Growing Pains, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 25, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/ 
feb2010/tc20100224_084405.htm (describing Google’s overseas business expansion as crucial 
for the company since domestic growth in search advertising has slowed down). This lessened 
power may cut in favor of allowing a horizontal merger because even if technology companies 
have a large market share in the United States, they might not have the capacity to exert a strong 
controlling force on the market. Along the same lines is the effect that foreign firms have on the 
U.S. economy. Foreign firms may be able to check the market power of domestic firms by 
providing alternatives to consumers, see, e.g., Ian Shapira, Begun, the Tablet Wars Have—and 
There’s No End in Sight, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2011, at A09 (explaining the tablet and mobile 
phone competition between Apple and Samsung, Apple’s South Korean competitor), which may 
also mitigate the probable anticompetitive effects of domestic mergers. Both of these factors—the 
activity of domestic corporations abroad and the impact of foreign companies on domestic 
markets—can greatly impact how the courts and the agencies define the relevant geographic 
market and evaluate a firm’s market power in some Section 7 cases. 
 278. Katz, supra note 243, at 2. 
 279. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4. 
 280. Woan, supra note 26, at 60–61. 
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tomorrow” because of innovation,
281
 thus upsetting the traditional 
notion that a firm’s ability to curb competition naturally results from 
its high market concentration.
282
 This results in product markets that 
are challenging to delineate in the terms of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, especially if the markets are volatile and of short 
duration.
283
 
Another trait of technology-based industries is that there are 
initial high fixed costs and subsequent low variable costs related to 
creating new products for consumers.
284
 High fixed costs refer to the 
large sums of money companies have to invest before engaging in 
any R&D.
285
 After these high fixed costs are incurred, companies 
experience low variable costs because reproducing the good or 
service is much cheaper than the initial investment.
286
 This differs 
from what traditional markets experience because the development 
and production of those products require low fixed costs and high 
variable costs.
287
 Consequently, technology-based industries need 
market power to set the price of their goods or services above what it 
takes to produce one more unit of the good or service in order to 
make the firm viable.
288
 
Finally, technology-based industries involve “knowledge 
spillovers”
289
 that “benefit[] . . . society at large, including the firms’ 
competitors.”
290
 This characteristic encourages firms to collaborate 
and even merge in order to gain access to information that can help 
them produce new and better products and services.
291
 These mergers 
can be seen as antithetical to horizontal merger policy because they 
have the potential to reduce the total number of firms in the industry 
and thus reduce the overall level of competition.
292
 However, these 
 
 281. Id. at 61. 
 282. See CHARLES T.C. COMPTON, IP ISSUES IN THE ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF MERGERS 3 
(2005), available at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/Berkeley_Conf_PaperJune_05.pdf. 
 283. Woan, supra note 26, at 61–62. 
 284. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4. 
 285. Woan, supra note 26, at 62. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 63. 
 289. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4. 
 290. Woan, supra note 26, at 63; see also GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4 (explaining 
that firms’ R&D efforts can produce knowledge that competitors may use). 
 291. Woan, supra note 26, at 63. 
 292. GILBERT & TOM, supra note 252, at 4. 
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horizontal mergers can improve consumer welfare by allowing 
companies to make products at a lower price and enabling them to 
pass on these savings to the public.
293
 
Even though R&D, fixed and variable costs, and knowledge 
spillovers in technology-based industries make horizontal merger 
analysis more complicated, they do not make such an analysis 
impossible.
294
 In fact, these characteristics require the FTC, the DOJ, 
and the courts to be sensitive to the special challenges that 
technology companies face when making the decision to merge with 
a competitor.
295
 Therefore, R&D, costs, and knowledge spillovers 
should be additional considerations that influence whether courts 
perceive a horizontal merger as either anticompetitive or beneficial 
to competition and consumers. 
B.  Case Study: 
The AT&T and T-Mobile Merger 
With these characteristics in mind, it is clear that both the 
agencies and the federal courts should pay close attention to the facts 
regarding horizontal mergers in rapidly changing industries. These 
industries are markedly different from traditional ones and should 
thus elicit a more nuanced antitrust analysis. While the DOJ’s 
lawsuit against AT&T and T-Mobile is now moot because the parties 
abandoned the merger, the transaction remains a prime example of 
why special care should be taken with mergers in technology-driven 
industries. 
1.  Description of Case 
On March 20, 2011, AT&T and T-Mobile agreed to enter into a 
$39 billion merger in which AT&T would acquire T-Mobile from its 
parent company, Deutsche Telekom AG (“Deutsche Telekom”).
296
 
Both AT&T and T-Mobile comprise two of the four major U.S. 
wireless service providers, with the other two companies being 
Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) and Sprint Nextel Corp. (“Sprint”).
297
 
 
 293. Id. 
 294. Woan, supra note 26, at 63. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 2–5. 
 297. Id. at 2. 
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Together, these companies comprise the “Big Four” and account for 
90 percent of the mobile wireless service market.
298
 
Because the AT&T/T-Mobile deal would collapse the Big Four 
into a “Big Three,” the DOJ filed suit in federal court in August 2011 
to enjoin the merger.
299
 Specifically, the DOJ argued in its complaint 
that the AT&T/T-Mobile merger would violate Section 7 by harming 
competition, thus resulting in “higher prices, less product variety and 
innovation, and poorer quality services due to reduced incentives to 
invest than would exist absent the merger.”
300
 In response to these 
allegations, AT&T argued that the merger would allow the merged 
company to “provide wireless broadband access to more people . . . 
and . . . provide more competition in an already competitive 
industry.”
301
 AT&T also utilized the failing firm defense
302
 
mentioned in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, stating that if the 
court did not approve the merger, T-Mobile would suffer from the 
lack of investment from its parent company.
303
 Finally, AT&T and 
its supporters argued that the merger would bring back five thousand 
call-center jobs to the United States
304
 and create an additional 
hundred thousand jobs,
305
 which would add more jobs to the “only 
unionized wireless telecommunications company in the country.”
306
 
 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Roger Cheng, AT&T Responds to Justice Department Lawsuit, CNET (Sept. 9, 2011), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-20104072-94/at-t-responds-to-justice-department-lawsuit/. 
 302. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 11. The failing firm defense says that “a merger 
is not likely to enhance market power if imminent failure . . . of one of the merging firms would 
cause the assets of that firm to exit the relevant market.” Id. In order to successfully utilize the 
failing firm defense, AT&T and T-Mobile must prove that 
(1) the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the 
near future; (2) it would not be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Act; and (3) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable 
alternative offers that would keep its tangible and intangible assets in the relevant 
market and pose a less severe danger to competition than does the proposed merger. 
Id. 
 303. Cheng, supra note 301. 
 304. AT&T to Bring 5,000 Call Center Jobs Back to U.S. Following T-Mobile Merger 
Closing, AT&T (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=20909&cdvn= 
news&newsarticleid=32663. 
 305. Roger Cheng, U.S. Attorney General: DOJ “Ready and Eager” for AT&T Trial, CNET 
(Nov. 8, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57320696-94/u.s-attorney-general-doj-ready-
and-eager-for-at-t-trial/. 
 306. Nathan Newman, Pro-Labor Progressives Should Support the AT&T-T-Mobile Merger, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/prolabor-
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Shortly after the DOJ filed for this injunction, seven state 
attorneys general filed suit to halt the merger as well.
307
 Even though 
the trial was scheduled to begin on February 13, 2012,
308
 AT&T 
stated it was still “interested in a solution that addresse[d] the DOJ’s 
issues with the T-Mobile merger.”
309
 Despite these efforts to make 
the deal a reality, AT&T and T-Mobile ended their merger plans on 
December 19, 2011, after acknowledging they “could not overcome 
stiff opposition by the Obama Administration.”
310
 
2.  What Would Have Happened with 
the Merger Given the Current State 
of Horizontal Merger Enforcement 
If AT&T and T-Mobile had gone through with their merger 
plans and if the agencies and the courts had analyzed the deal in 
accordance with precedent, the merger would most likely have been 
blocked. Since the definition of a relevant product or geographic 
market would not have been an issue, the court likely would have 
resolved the failing firm defense and the factors of market share and 
concentration, unilateral effects, entry barriers, and efficiencies in the 
DOJ’s favor without much debate in court. 
In arguing against the merger, the DOJ would have asserted that 
the transaction between AT&T and T-Mobile would have increased 
the new firm’s market share and reduced the number of major firms 
in the wireless telecommunications market, thus posing a threat to 
competition. This increased market share would most likely have 
 
progressives-sho_b_883321.html; see also Maria Elena Durazo, Defending Merger Between 
AT&T and T-Mobile, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.dailynews.com/opinions/ 
ci_19108319 (highlighting an AFL-CIO member’s argument that unionizing T-Mobile workers as 
a result of the merger with AT&T will give them “the right and opportunity to bargain for better 
[working] conditions”); Sacha Segan, Why Do So Many Groups Support the AT&T/T-Mobile 
Merger?, PCMAG (Jun. 1, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/ 
0,2817,2386277,00.asp#fbid=hVu_JTdJkWu (describing how the merger would be beneficial to 
T-Mobile’s non-unionized workers). 
 307. Cecilia Kang, AT&T, T-Mobile Merger Faces New Obstacle as Seven States Join DOJ 
Lawsuit, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
tech/atandt-t-mobile-merger-faces-new-obstacle-as-seven-states-join-doj-lawsuit/2011/09/16/ 
gIQAC3a2XK_blog.html. 
 308. Cheng, supra note 305. 
 309. Cheng, supra note 301. 
 310. Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for-t-
mobile/. 
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been evidence of the proposed firm’s enhanced market power in a 
highly concentrated market. As a result, the merger would have been 
blocked if the court accepted the DOJ’s argument that the transaction 
would decrease competition since there would be three major cell 
phone service providers instead of four, with the AT&T/T-Mobile 
firm as the company controlling the market. 
Because of this enhanced market power, the DOJ would have 
also argued that the merger would have resulted in the unilateral 
effects of higher prices and reduced variety of products.
311
 This 
argument might or might not have been valid, especially since the 
wireless telecommunications industry is technology-based and 
involves a high level of innovation and R&D.
312
 Therefore, even if 
there would have been a merger, the new AT&T/T-Mobile firm 
might have been forced to lower prices and provide more products to 
keep up with the technological advances of Verizon and Sprint. 
Without more facts, however, this would be difficult to prove. 
The DOJ might have also argued that the AT&T and T-Mobile 
merger would have made it more difficult for new firms to enter the 
market. Because of the size and market power of the merged 
company, smaller companies might have decided to opt out of 
entering the wireless telecommunications industry because it would 
have been an unprofitable venture. High entry barriers resulting from 
the merger would have prevented new companies from entering the 
national wireless telecommunications market and might possibly 
have prevented them from entering the regional wireless 
telecommunications market as well, even though AT&T and T-
Mobile do not provide coverage in certain areas. 
AT&T and T-Mobile’s strongest arguments against the DOJ’s 
traditional horizontal merger analysis would have come in the form 
of efficiencies and the failing firm defense. AT&T could have argued 
that the merger would have resulted in more product innovation and 
would have provided more jobs in an ailing economy.
313
 Another 
defense that AT&T could have raised is that blocking the merger 
would have put AT&T, T-Mobile, and their respective customers in a 
 
 311. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, supra note 2, at 21. 
 312. See supra Part IV.A. 
 313. Id. 
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worse position.
314
 Specifically, AT&T was required to pay Deutsche 
Telekom “$3 billion in cash and an additional $3 billion-worth of 
wireless spectrum” if the proposed merger was not completed.
315
 
AT&T could have also argued that this would not prevent Deutsche 
Telekom from stopping its investment in T-Mobile,
316
 which could 
be “potentially disastrous” for the smaller company.
317
 However, 
given the courts’ sliding scale approach when it comes to efficiency 
arguments,
318
 these innovation and job creation factors may not have 
been enough to overcome the merger’s anticompetitive nature. 
Additionally, it is unclear whether AT&T and T-Mobile would have 
been able to satisfy the three factors necessary to successfully use the 
failing firm defense.
319
 
3.  What This Failed Deal Means for 
Future Technology Mergers and What Could Happen 
if This Article’s Suggestions Are Adopted 
If AT&T and T-Mobile had gone through with their merger 
plans, the transaction would have most likely been prevented under a 
traditional horizontal merger analysis. This Article’s proposed 
changes would probably not have altered that result. This, however, 
does not mean that it would be futile for the agencies and the courts 
to adopt these proposals; rather, it shows that the AT&T and T-
Mobile merger was doomed from the start. With any merger of two 
large players in an industry with only four main competitors, 
companies planning to unify their operations must be wary of 
government resistance due to the threat that the transaction poses to 
both competition and consumers. In this case, the AT&T/T-Mobile 
merger would have given the new company 80 percent of the 
wireless telecommunications market,
320
 and this extreme market 
 
 314. Id.; David Goldman, Without AT&T, T-Mobile Is a Wireless White Elephant, CNN 
MONEY (Sept. 7, 2011, 10:13 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/technology/tmobile_ 
options/index.htm. 
 315. Goldman, supra note 314. This in fact is the penalty that AT&T faces now that the 
merger is no longer a viable option. 
 316. Supra Part IV.A. 
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 318. See 2010 GUIDELINES, supra note 16, § 10. 
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share would have put Verizon and Sprint at a large competitive 
disadvantage. 
While AT&T and T-Mobile would have lost under either the 
traditional approach to horizontal merger enforcement or a more 
nuanced approach, there is a benefit to adopting this Article’s 
proposals: companies’ arguments for efficiencies, innovation, and 
job creation would at least be given more weight. Given the current 
recession, the impact that these factors have on competition and 
consumers is important to consider. Cost savings could benefit 
merging companies, which could then pass the savings onto 
consumers via new and improved products created by potentially 
larger and more efficient work forces. At any rate, adopting and 
implementing these proposals could create precedent that companies 
can rely on when planning and defending their transactions, 
especially in dynamic industries such as technology and 
telecommunications. 
Mergers in technology industries would especially benefit from 
this Article’s proposals in the area of efficiencies. Assuming that 
AT&T and T-Mobile had continued defending their merger, the DOJ 
could have seriously considered the companies’ efficiency arguments 
regarding innovation and job creation in such a dynamic market as 
wireless telecommunications. AT&T claimed that the merger would 
have increased wireless broadband access to more people,
321
 which 
could have been the result of R&D efforts to improve networks and 
acquire better mobile phones for consumers. While the DOJ could 
have said that these effects are not quantifiable enough to merit a 
legitimate efficiency argument, AT&T and T-Mobile could have 
asserted that they should have had a chance to prove that they could 
have achieved these efficiencies because of the rapidly evolving 
nature of technology-based industries.
322
 Together, AT&T and T-
Mobile could have afforded the high fixed costs associated with 
R&D and then passed the benefits of lower variable costs on to 
consumers.
323
 AT&T and T-Mobile’s strongest argument would have 
been that the merger could potentially create 105,000 unionized jobs, 
which would help alleviate the pressure of the high unemployment 
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rate on the U.S. economy.
324
 The companies also could have stated 
that because AT&T was the single unionized wireless 
telecommunications company in the market,
325
 this merger would 
have been the only way to create more jobs that would give workers 
the ability to bargain for and achieve higher wages, better working 
conditions, and more benefits.
326
 Because it seems that public 
support for unions is weak despite these advantages to workers,
327
 
AT&T and T-Mobile’s push for the creation of unionized jobs in the 
wireless telecommunications market would have been even more 
appealing. Therefore, these efficiency arguments would have been 
essential to AT&T and T-Mobile’s case and could have been given 
great weight when compared to the merger’s potential 
anticompetitive effects. 
Finally, application of behavioral economics may also help the 
courts and the agencies predict how mergers like the one between 
AT&T and T-Mobile may affect other companies and consumers. By 
taking into account bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and 
bounded self-interest,
328
 the courts and agencies would be able to 
determine what biases are motivating the reactions of the merging 
companies’ competitors and customers. In the AT&T/T-Mobile 
example, Verizon and Sprint—the other half of the wireless 
telecommunications Big Four—could have opposed the AT&T/T-
Mobile merger for fear of harm to competition: prices would have 
gone up as a result of the merger, which would benefit the 
companies, but consumers may have remained with AT&T and T-
Mobile anyway because of brand loyalty. Verizon and Sprint may 
have also opposed the merger because they wanted to buy T-Mobile 
themselves. It also would have been interesting to consider biases of 
the consumers who would have been affected by the deal. For 
example, these customers may have supported the merger because 
they did not want to lose out on increased service in the form of 
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better cell phone reception and more choices in phones. Additionally, 
there may have been an issue of brand loyalty because some phones 
are only offered by certain carriers; regardless of potential changes 
with AT&T and T-Mobile, customers may have stayed with Verizon 
or Sprint. Finally, customers may have remained with Verizon or 
Sprint because they were accustomed to those companies and their 
current wireless plans. Therefore, these examples of consumer 
irrationality could have impacted whether the AT&T/T-Mobile 
merger would actually have affected competition in the wireless 
telecommunications industry and could have been considered using 
behavioral economics. While these specific arguments pertain to 
telecommunications, companies planning mergers in other rapidly 
evolving industries could use similar arguments. Because these 
points focus on the behavior of customers and firms, behavioral 
economics could give courts more to consider and provide a more 
complete picture of both the positive and negative effects certain 
mergers may have on the market. 
If the agencies and the federal courts adopt this Article’s 
proposals—especially those regarding efficiencies and behavioral 
economics—and clearly lay out what they will consider in regard to 
these economic tools, cases similar to the now-expired AT&T/T-
Mobile merger effort would likely become helpful precedent for 
other technology-based companies that plan horizontal mergers. 
Even though this more nuanced approach to horizontal merger 
enforcement would have been detrimental to AT&T and T-Mobile—
innovation, job creation, and behavioral economics arguments would 
probably not have been enough to outweigh harm to competition in 
the agencies’ sliding-scale analysis
329
—it may prove to be more 
useful for other companies in rapidly developing industries in the 
future. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the Obama Administration’s more aggressive approach to 
horizontal merger enforcement seems to be appropriate given the 
weakened state of the U.S. economy, the system is far from perfect. 
The FTC, the DOJ, and the federal courts have varied when it comes 
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to their analytical approaches to the subject, and this is an issue that 
must be resolved if the government is to achieve its goals of 
protecting competition, promoting consumer welfare, and being 
transparent in its horizontal merger enforcement policies. This 
Article has suggested that (1) the courts should be more open to 
using the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines; (2) the FTC and the 
DOJ should streamline how they litigate merger cases and should 
each be subject to the same burden of proof when trying to obtain an 
injunction against potentially anticompetitive mergers; (3) the 
agencies should be more open to efficiency arguments dealing with 
innovation and job creation; and (4) both the agencies and the courts 
should utilize principles from behavioral economics to more 
accurately forecast how a horizontal merger will affect a given 
market. These considerations are especially important for companies 
in rapidly changing industries dependent on technology, such as 
AT&T and T-Mobile, because market developments in those 
industries are more difficult to predict. The adoption of such 
considerations will lead to a more nuanced approach to horizontal 
merger enforcement, which, although it may not have helped AT&T 
and T-Mobile, may greatly assist both future merging parties and 
consumers by ensuring that competition and consumer welfare are 
protected. 
 
